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Abstract
Socio Demographic and Motivational Differences Between Active Participants And
Supporters In PKK Terrorist Organization
By Gokhan Koca, Ph.D.
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of
Philosophy at Virginia Commonwealth University

Virginia Commonwealth University, 2012
Director: Judith L. Twigg, Ph.D., Professor, L. Douglas Wilder School of Government
and Public Affairs

Especially for last three decades many of the scholars have tried to provide
general terrorist profile, which is commonly usable for all terrorists. They were seeking
to identify the process of becoming terrorist (Sageman, 2004; Russel&Miller, 1977;
Strentz, 1988; Hassan, 2001). The main problem on those studies is that, without looking
at degree of involvement of terrorist they just focus on “who becomes a terrorist and
why” and they prefer to ignore different type of characteristics about terrorist. Yilmaz
(2009) tried to underline and answer this subject by studying on arrest results about
DHKP/C and Hizbullah terrorist organizations in Turkey. This study aims to analyze
socio-demographic and motivational differences of PKK terrorist organization members
who are belong to different involvement degrees (active participant and supporter).
Data regarding the involvement level of terrorists was collected from terrorist
biographies. Research hypotheses were tested using bivariate and multivariate statistical
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analyses. According to findings relative deprivation, frustration and differential association
models are fit to explain involvement level of PKK terrorists.
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

Introduction

Especially during last three decades many of the scholars have tried to provide a
general terrorist profile, which would be commonly usable for all terrorists. They were
seeking to identify the process of becoming a terrorist (Sageman, 2004; Russel&Miller,
1977; Strentz, 1988; Hassan, 2001).
The main problem with those studies is that, without looking at the degree of
involvement of terrorists they just focus on “who becomes a terrorist and why” and they
prefer to ignore different types of characteristics of terrorists. Yilmaz (2009) tried to
focus his studies on this subject, particularly the analysis of arrest results of members of
DHKP/C and Hizbullah terrorist organizations in Turkey. This study aims to analyze the
socio-demographic and motivational differences of PKK terrorist organization members
who are involved to varying degrees in these organizations (as active participants and
supporters).

Definition of Terrorism
The general consensus is that no other event in the last decade has dominated the
world like the occurrence of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Al-Qaeda's surprise attack on the
United States on September 11, 2001 shocked the international community and forced
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states and international organizations to get used to new procedures, ideas, and policies in
the war against international terrorism.
The issue of defining terrorism is complicated. In today’s world, politicians still
cannot find common ground with respect to defining terrorism because of different
political and ideological interests (Hoffmann, 2001). This definition problem makes the
concept of terrorism much more complicated especially in terms of counter terrorism
efforts. According to Martin (2003), “Terrorism has been a dark feature of human
behavior since the dawn of recorded history”. It is a disease that attacks all people
regardless of nation, religion, language, and race, and kills innocent people with brutal
tactics that cannot be justified by any religious or political approach, or ideology.
One of the most significant reasons for this lack of standard definition is the fact
that the social and political scientists, as well as countries making the definition tend to
take into consideration their own political and ideological interests. In the Turkish AntiTerrorism Act (April 12th, 1991), terrorism is defined as follows: "Terrorism is all kinds
of activities to be attempted by a member or members of an organization for the purpose
of changing the characteristics of the Republic which are stated in the constitution, and
the political, legal, social, secular, economic system, destroying the territorial integrity of
the state and the government and its people, weakening or ruining or invading the
authority of the government, demolishing the rights and freedom, jeopardizing the
existence of Turkish government and Republic, destroying the public order or peace and
security (Resmi Gazete, 1991)."
The second article of the Law, referring to the first article, states: “A person who
is a member of those organizations established to reach the goals that are mentioned in
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Article 1, is considered a terror criminal if he commits a crime with other persons or
alone in accordance with those goals; or if he is a member of those organizations even
though he did not commit the intended crimes. Persons who commit crimes on behalf of
the terror organization are also considered terror criminal and punished as terror criminal
even though they are not the members of the terror organization” (Resmi Gazete, 1991).
In short, a terrorist could be defined as a person who is a member of a terrorist
organization; or commits a crime in the name of an organization as a supporter or active
participant; or leads the group to further the goals of that organization.
Terrorist Organization
The Anti-Terror Law defines a terrorist organization as a group formed by two or
more individuals to realize the aforementioned objectives cited in the very definition of
terrorism within the same law (Anti-Terror Law, 1991, article 1).
Act of Terrorism
According to Turkish Penal Code articles, any violent or non-violent act of crime
such as assassination, bombing, hijacking, robbery, restriction of liberty, threatening and
forcing is considered an act of terrorism if it is committed to achieve the goals cited in the
definition of terrorism section.
Crime and Terrorism Similarities and Differences
Terrorism often involves many different kinds of crime such as kidnapping, arson,
murder, conspiracy, and others; therefore, it is very difficult to make a distinction
between terrorism and crime (Schmalleger, 2003). Terrorists achieve their goals through
the use or threat of violence just like other criminals (Koseli, 2006). The main differences
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between crime and terrorism are a separate motivation and goals. Especially, the political
goals that set terrorist acts apart from criminal acts (Crenshaw, 2001).
Hamm & Van De Voorde (2005) studied terrorists’ involvement in a variety of
crimes ranging from motor vehicle violations, immigration fraud, and manufacturing
illegal firearms to counterfeiting, armed bank robbery, and smuggling weapons of mass
destruction. The routine activity perspective and social learning theory were utilized in
this study to analyze crimes. The routine activities theory was important with respect to
identifying opportunities to commit crime, and social learning theory was important in
the context of focusing on how terrorists acquire the necessary skills to turn opportunity
into criminality.
The American Terrorism Study (ATS) database compared the criminal acts of
international jihad groups with domestic right-wing groups. The study also included six
case studies of these groups. Hamm & Van De Voorde (2005) argues that all terrorist
organizations need money, communication systems, transportation, material, identity
documents, and safe havens in the pursuit of their goals. To be able to meet these needs
they have to seize good opportunities and learn the necessary skills. Crimes that may
finance these needs reflect the natural history and culture of each organization. According
to Hamm & Van De Voorde (2005), bank robbery, credit card theft, document
counterfeiting, motor vehicle violations, and money laundering are the types of crimes
that can meet the needs of terrorist organizations.
Terrorism has three main elements. These are: ideology, violence and a group of
people. If we find a specific two of these elements, such as ideology and a group of
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people, we can see a political party; but if we find a group of people and violence, we
may be faced with an organized crime group (Erkan & Dilmac, 2006).
Types of Terrorism
Hoffman (2001) analyzes terrorist organizations in three groups: left wing
terrorist

organizations

(Marksist-Leninist,

Maoist

groups),

separatist

terrorist

organizations, and right wing and religious based terrorist groups. We can see the same
structure in Turkey, as well.
Especially after 9/11 attacks, people have focused on religious based terrorist
organizations. The well-known and recognized image of a terrorist is the Hizbollah or Al
Qaida guerilla who commits a suicide attack against US soldiers. This portrait conceals
actual ethnic terrorism from the policy community today (Byman, 1998).
Ethnic Terrorism
Ethnic terrorism is not a new issue in our world. The main reason for this problem
is that most nations’ populations are heterogeneous, with distinct identities with a shared
history, culture and a collective self-interest (Dekmejian, 2007).
Byman (1998) defines ethnic terrorism as “deliberate violence by a subnational
ethnic group to advance to advance its cause.”
Byman (1998) focused on the structure and logic of ethnic terrorism in his study.
He identified the core characteristics of ethnic terrorism. According to Byman (1998),
ethnic terrorism is a unique entity, and ethnic terrorists are usually more nationalistic than
their counterparts. Ethnic terrorists try to forge a national identity; therefore, they are
more realistic than other terrorists. Their main purpose is to mobilize a community by
appealing to the nationalistic background of a certain ethnic group. Byman (1998) says
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that terrorist activity creates a statement about the group's identity. When the expected
government actions (or harassments or operations) follow terrorist actions, this draws
attention to the group and they create a victim’s portrait. This process may help to
increase public awareness of ethnic or nationalistic grievances and it may lead to the
acquisition of new sources of support. Terrorism also can encourage other ethnic groups
and force them to either ally with the terrorists or oppose them.
Violence plays a critical role in ethnic terrorism. However, political terrorists use
violence in a symbolic manner and religious extremists use it to make a theological
statement—violence is the raison d'être of ethnic terrorism. As long as the violence
continues, the idea of the identity and existence of ethnic differences can remain alive.
Even if the political aims are too far out to reach, violence keeps the conflict going. The
fear created by violence supports ethnic conflicts. Violence also helps to undermine
moderates who seek peaceful solutions.
Fear is also an important tool for ethnic terrorists. Political terrorists use fear to
create a misapprehension that the government’s sociopolitical structure cannot work.
Violent ethnic terrorists use fear to polarize various constituencies such as cultural
differences, forcing greater identification with one's own group and also keeping a group
from developing alternative identities.
Governments are limited in their response to resolve the issue and mitigate such
fear. They can join the game and try to support opponent identities, or engage in group
punishment, but this tactic is usually not successful and helps the terrorist camp. They
can try to achieve the cooperation of moderates, but moderates usually do not have enough
power to control the terrorists. Finally, they can open the doors to political participation;
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however, some of them are reluctant to do this because it would seem as though they are
rewarding political violence. As a result, creating fear is a powerful tactic for ethnic
terrorists.
Every terrorist group needs to get public support; in other words, they need to
have a built-in audience. When we compare the three groups, ideological terrorists must
focus on the whole political spectrum, and violent religious extremists must address a
broad theological audience, but ethnic terrorists simply tell their community that they are
part of the group. Byman (1998) says there is no room for converts, nor is there a place for
mass appeal.
Most analysts focus on the outcomes of a terrorist campaign. They mainly focus
on, What do the terrorists hope to achieve? They measure the success of the campaign
and the response of security forces to assess the effectiveness of counterterrorist actions.
Byman (1998) argues that this technique is not suitable for ethnic terrorism. Violence is
a type of terrorist communication, and success is measured in the continuing threat of
violence. Any target outside the ethnic commune will suffice because there is no place for
an innocent bystander. Anyone who is not in the group is an enemy, and violent action
against the enemy is the measure of success.
Unlike ideological terrorists, ethnic terrorist organizations tend to be long-lasting.
They can build logistical structures much more easily than ideological terrorists because
they appeal to an ethnic group, and they can hide in a ready-made population. Byman
(1998) suggests three methods for government policy: Empowering the ethnic
community, winning over moderates to the political system, and encouraging selfpolicing.
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When the ethnic community becomes a partner with the prevailing authority,
violence and terrorism can be reduced. Governments that have used these strategies have
been successful in reducing violence in areas such as Ireland, Turkey, Spain, and Sri
Lanka. Yet the situation is always volatile, and there has been no attempt, for instance, to
include moderates in Chechnya. India's endemic terrorism is more complicated because
ethnicity is tied to differing religions. Just when it appears that security forces are making
gains, terrorist violence can frequently be used to derail attempts to bring peace.
The Roots of Terrorism in Turkey
Turkey has suffered from terrorism since the 1960's. Marxist-Leninist left-wing
terror organizations have been in the field since the 1960’s. Those groups were especially
active between 1960 and 1980, and during this period their activities cost 5,000 lives
(Ozgen, 1989:3). Since the early 1980's, separatist Kurdish movements have gained the
dominant position on the agenda of the Turkish government (Kule, 2007). The results of
this terror wave show an overall cost of more than 30,000 lives and around 15 billion
dollars (Sevis, 1999). Additionally, starting from the early 1990's, religious based
terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah and Al-Qaida Turkey cells have also acquired
an important role in Turkey with their serious attacks against both Turkish and foreign
targets in Turkey (Teymur, 2007).
Turkey is a mixed society which includes different religious, ethnic and cultural
groups. Turkey is also a kind of bridge between Europe and Asia. The country’s geopolitical and geo-strategic positions and its political approaches can appear to be against
some national and international groups and states. Hence, these countries can use cold
war tactics against Turkey, such as supporting ethnic groups in their bid to cause a civil
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war (Yildiz, 2004). Therefore, ethnic terrorism (the PKK terrorist organization) has an
important role in Turkey’s agenda.

The Kurds and The Origins Of The Kurdish Separatist Movement

Ethnic Origins of the Kurds

Because of its geographic nature Turkey has been multi-ethnic and a cultural land
through history (Gunes&Ayata, 1996, Cerrah, 2002). However, Jews and Christians have
been accepted and treated as ethnic minority groups, while Abkhazas, Laz, Bosnians,
Georgians, Albanians, Chechens and Kurds have been accepted as an integral part of the
dominant culture since the Ottomon time (Cerrah, 2002). Especially in the Ottomon time
the main reason of people to integrate with the Turkish culture was the religion of Islam.
Ottoman Islamic law accepted only non-Muslims as minorities.
During the period of the Ottoman Empire, Kurds did not have any problem with
Turks, and they enjoyed a quasi-autonomous status in this region. The root of the Kurd
problem was planted in 1880 with the rebellion activities led by Sheikh Ubeydullah
(Laciner&Bal, 2004). At the beginning, Kurdish activates started a cultural movement
especially after the first and second Constitutional Period of the Ottoman Empire
(Ozcelik,2006). After World War I, the Ottoman Empire collapsed with the Serves Treaty
in 1920. In that treaty, the creators "envisaged interim autonomy for the predominantly
Kurdish areas of Turkey with a view to full independence if the inhabitants of these areas
wanted this." (McDowal, 1997, Ozcelik, 2006). However, they were invited in Serves
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Conference by the allies, they fight against them in the Independence War with Turks for
the new Republic. After the Independence War, only non-muslims were identified as a
minority in the Lozan Treaty (1923) (Kule, 2007). There were some Kurdish movements
during that period such as: the revolts of Sheikh Said in 1925, Agri (Ararat) from 192630, and Dersim (Tunceli) in 1937. Even though most scholars believe that the 1925
Sheikh Said revolt was caused by a mix of Kurdish nationalist and religious sentiments,
the last two revolts were semi-nationalist, but they were all regionally-bound (Ozcelik,
2006, McDowal, 1997, Laciner&Bal, 2004).

The main characteristics of Kurdish

rebellions in those times were more local, seeking the protection of their life style rather
than a unified Kurdish Nationalism.
In the 1950’s, with the multiparty system, loosing traditional ties by moving big
cities for education or economic reasons characteristics of Kurdish movement has been
changed. The main changes were: first, the Kurdish elites started to engage in a new
publishing activity involving a unified Kurdish language for the promotion of Kurdish
ethnic identity. Second, this new movement found a place in the left-wing movement in
Turkish politics by joining the Turkish Labor Party (TLP).
Kurdish people speak two main languages: Kurmanjii and Sorani, and especially
those people who live in Turkey, northern Iraq, Syria, and some parts of Iran, speak
Kurmanji (Barkey & Fuller, 1998). Bruinessen (1989) defines Kurds as “all native
speakers of Kurmanji or Zaza, as well as those Turkish-speaking persons who claim
descent from Kurmanji or Zaza speakers who still (or again) consider themselves as
Kurds”. Laciner and Bal (2004) categorize three main dialectic groups: Kurmanji (spoken
in Turkey), Zaza (spoken in Iraq) and Gurani (spoken in Iran). According to Barkey &
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Fuller (1998), geography has an important role in Kurdish identity. They expound on
how Kurdish people lived primarily in a mountainous area; they were spread and isolated
from each other. Nomadic life and isolation helped the development of Kurdish identity.
Several discussions on Kurdish identity exist in the literature. Some scholars claim that
Kurds are one of the Turkish tribes (Laciner&Bal, 2004; Sageman, 2004) Cerrah (2002)
asserts that the Turks and Kurds has a common history. When the Turks conquered
Anatolia they fought against the Byzantines (in the Malazgirt War), and the Kurds also
fought the Byzantines on the side of the Turks (Erkal, 1994). Another example is found
during the time of Ottotman Empire under Abdulhamid II. He created regiments with
only Kurdish officers named Hamidiye regiments. Those regiments fought against the
Armanians in 1905 (Kirisci&Winrow, 1997).
There are nearly 30 million Kurdish people who live in different countries,
including Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Syria and Armenia (USA Report, 2007). Nearly half of the
Kurdish population lives in Turkey (around 20% of the total population in Turkey) and
most of them are Sunni Muslims (Ozer&Gunbeyi, 2008; Barkey & Fuller, 1998).
It is important to look at the Kurdish problem and its reasons from a true
perspective. Cerrah (2002) tries to explain this conflict. In his opinion:
1- This conflict does not originate from racism. Turkish Kurds can join in all aspects
of political, social and economic life. As an example, there are presidents, prime
ministers, cabinet ministers, generals in the armed forces, and police chiefs from
Kurdish origin who are Turkish citizens.
2- This conflict also does not originate from religious differences.
3- This conflict cannot be understood and explained with a single reason.
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The PKK
Formed in 1974, the PKK terrorist organization (Workers' Party of Kurdistan,
Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan) evolved from the Ankara Democratic Patriotic Association
of Higher Education, known as "APOCUS." Its first and only leader, Abdullah Ocalan, or
Apo (as he is called), was at that time a student of political science at Ankara University.
During this period, instead of being in the south east part of Turkey where a large
Kurdish population resides, the PKK was based in Ankara (the capital city).
The PKK was established on November 27, 1978 in Fis, a village near Diyarbakir,
by Abdullah OCALAN and his friends. During the 1970’s, extreme leftist movements
were very popular in universities. Just like his cohorts, Abdullah OCALAN focused on
Marxist doctrine as a student in Ankara University. During his university years he joined
several extreme leftist groups and he realized the potential of Kurdish support (Barkey &
Fuller, 1998). However Marxist-Leninist ideology was not fit for the Kurdish population
who were religious, tribal and undereducated. Therefore, the PKK was founded to
achieve a communist revolution with Marxist-Leninst ideology through armed struggle
against the Turkish Government and this eventually led to the ultimate goal of
establishing a separate Kurdish state (Ankara Papers, 2004).
The PKK was in Ankara (the capital of Turkey) rather than in the southeast of
Turkey where a large Kurdish population resides or in a Middle Eastern country. When it
was established in 1978, the primary objective of the PKK was to foster a communist
revolution in Turkey, not to create an Independent Kurdistan which Apo now claims as
his main goal. According to Bruinessen (1998), the PKK and Kurdish population cannot
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fit well in Turkey; therefore, the PKK is the only Kurdish group whose members prefer
action rather than ideological terminology.
In 1979 and 1980, Ocalan and his aides went to Beqaa Valley for ideological and
military training. Another important aim of this move was that they wanted to escape and
save the PKK from the counter terrorism measures of the 1980 military coup. The PKK
had to face not only the pressures and operations of the Turkish government but also the
attacks of right wing terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah (Imset, 1993).
In 1981 and 1982, the PKK organized two separate congresses where Ocalan
identified the structure and strategy of the terrorist organizations. After those meetings,
the PKK initiated the big terror campaigns in 1984 (in Eruh and Semdinli). In those
terrorist attacks, the PKK attacked both combatant and non-combatant civilians and
security forces.
In a 1995 interview (Korn, 1995), the PKK’s leader Ocalan explained changes in
the new PKK position. Ocalan stated that he believed in "scientific socialism." He said that
this would become a new path because the Muslim population and the Kurds in particular
had suffered at the hands of Marxist-Leninists. He cast his statements in anti-imperialist
format, stating that Kurdistan was only resisting imperialist powers.
Abdullah Ocalan was captured in Kenya in February 1999, and a security court
sentenced him to death in June. Ocalan offered to chart a new course for the PKK a few
weeks later. Since Turkey was lobbying to join the European Union (EU), it delayed and
eventually reversed the death sentence. (Members of the EU may not invoke capital
punishment.)
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With his despotic style, Ocalan has the absolute power within the PKK (Cerrah,
2002). The main goal of the PKK is achieving an independent Kurdish state in the
southeast part of Turkey. According to Barkey & Fuller (1998), the PKK also aims to
realize a political and social revolution among the Kurds in order to transform Kurdish
society’s feudal structure. The most important change in the ideology of the PKK can be
seen in the post-Cold War era. The program that was involved in the first manifesto of
the PKK is as follows:
“The structure of the evolution will be a national democratic revolution. The
minimum objective will be to establish an independent non-aligned Kurdistan State in the
region. The maximum objective will be to establish a state based on Marxist-Leninist
principles. The proletariat will be the pioneering force of the revolution. The peasants
will be the major force of the revolution. The main alliance for the revolution will be the
alliance between workers, peasants and intellectual youth. (…) propaganda activities will
be supported by armed violence” (Ankara Papers 2004).
Today, the PKK continues its ruthless and brutal tactics against security forces,
government officers (such as teachers, doctors, etc.) and civilian people (especially
Kurdish people). One of the most difficult parts of terrorism studies is identifying the
members as terrorist or freedom fighters. Hoffmann (1998) identifies a clear difference
between these two groups. The difference is that freedom fighters carry out attacks
against only security forces, and never target civilian people; while terrorists do not seek
a target, and they attack both civilians and security forces. According to this point of
view, the PKK is a terrorist organization. They attack also civilian people especially
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Kurdish people who do not support them or who help the security forces, or just create
support through fear tactics.
There are three main body parts in the PKK structure, namely:
-

The Central Committee (PKK):

The leading group consists of the

members of the central committee, which is under Ocalan’s control.
-

ERNK (The National Liberation Front of Kurdistan): This was created in
1985. The main objective of ERNK is to provide intelligence, engage
political propaganda, and support recruitment. ERNK was changed into
YDG (Kurdish Democratic People Forces) in 2000.

-

ARGK (People’s Liberation Army of Kurdistan): This is the armed
propaganda wing and was created in 1986 (Teymur&Smith, 2008).

The PKK changed its name to first KADEK then PKK-KONGRAGEL in order to
escape the US Terrorist Organizations List and the European Terrorist Organization list.
However, they could not achieve such an escape because of the brutal attacks they started
to use again in the name of the PKK. Sometimes, PKK members undertake terrorist
attacks in the news media in the name of TAK (Kurdistan Freedom Falcons- Teyrebaze
Azadiya Kurdistan). Actually, TAK is not a separate organization from the PKK. When
PKK members carry out terrorist attacks in the west part of Turkey or tourist places
where foreigners can be killed, they undertake the attacks on the name of TAK in order to
escape international pressures.
The PKK’s main aim is to create a free Kurdistan state in the southeast part of
Turkey. Their strategy consists of two main parts: Guerilla War and diplomatic efforts in
the international area. They want to achieve their goal in four stages: Cultural autonomy,
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Local autonomy, Federation, and Independence for Kurdistan. Some authors assert that
this strategic approach also has similarities with Mao’s theory of war. According to this
theory there are three stages to achieve the goal. These are: gaining the support of the
population by attacking its enemies and government machinery, intensified terrorist
attacks to break the government authority and conventional warfare to seize cities.
As a result of the PKK violence, more than 36,000 troops and civilians have been
killed by the PKK since 1984 (Laciner, 2006). The estimated number of armed forces in
the PKK are around 10,000 and since 2001, the PKK was designated a terrorist
organization by the State Department (Kule, 2007).
Problem Statement
Turkey is affected by many ideological waves because of its geographical
position. Therefore, there are many terrorist organizations in existence in this country,
both extremist right or leftist groups. Especially, starting from the 1960s, Turkey suffered
significantly from these groups’ terrorist activities. The PKK is one of the most problems
that threatens the future of Turkey. More than 36,000 security forces (troops) and
civilians have been killed overall in the PKK terror campaign. The Turkish government
uses several tactics against terrorism (Yayla, 2001). A lot of legislation has been enacted,
such as the “Return Home” law, to encourage terrorists to leave terrorism and return to
their homes. In addition, certain social, economic, and cultural initiatives were instituted
and billions have been spent to stop the PKK terrorism. There is a popular (both free and
forced) support of the PKK in Turkey. Hence, the PKK must be isolated from the
Kurdish population through successful policies. Without identifying the differences
between active participants and supporters’ motivations, achieving successful policies is
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impossible. Scholars and politicians did not have enough information about active
participants and supporters and they did not work on motivational differences between
these two groups. Previous policy attempts just focused on only one group and only a part
of their motivations; therefore, successful policy applications could not be achieved.

Purpose of the Study
People always make decisions in their lives. They decide what to wear in the
morning, and what to eat during the day. After high school they make decisions about
college, and after collage they make decisions about their careers. Similarly, in terrorist
organizations, people make decisions on whether to join the organization or not, but this
decision is not the final decision. They make also decisions about membership status—
that is, whether to be active participants or remain simply as supporters.
Therefore, the main purpose of this study is to identify the socio-demographic
and motivational differences between active participants and supporters in the PKK
terrorist organization, in order to make successful counteractive policies. In the past,
policy attempts focused on only some aspects of the group’s motivation.
Significance of the Study
However, terrorism studies rarely allow an overarching research that would
identify the determinants of terrorist decision making at the individual and organizational
level. Mostly, researches lack the opportunity to contact terrorists in a systematic way,
which makes representativeness problematic. On the other hand, terrorists are mostly
reluctant to reveal their motives even though researchers may have access to them.
Therefore, it is difficult to collect data that would enhance both representativeness and
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the quantity of data collected. In order to overcome these issues, this study collects data
from the biographies of terrorists, which were written by terrorists themselves. A typical
biography includes information about demographics and motivations of the applicant.
Therefore, biographies are rich in terms of the motivations of terrorists, as to why they
are willing to join the terrorist group. Those biographies were seized in police operations
in Turkey.
Biographies were not originally collected for this study. They are written for
membership application. The reliability of information is questionable; however, there
are two features which enhance the reliability of information given. First, biographies are
written by individual terrorists for membership, and with no other motivations. Terrorists
write their biographies with free will. Second, terrorists are aware of the fact that they
have to provide accurate information in their biographies because the leadership can
cross-check the accuracy of information. The questions in a biography are listed as
follows:
1- What is your name?
2- Where were you born? And what is your birth date?
3- What is your gender?
4- What is your ethnicity?
5- What is your level of education?
6- How many brothers and sister do you have? And what is your family’s
economic situation?
7- What is the current situation of your family?
8- What is your family’s political background?
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9- Do you have any family member in the PKK?
10- Did you lose any family member, relatives or friend in any of the security
forces’ operations?
11- Do you have any relatives who work in the police or army force?
12- Do you have a significant relation with someone from the opposite sex?
13- Do you have any job experience?
14- Do you have any special knowledge, such as computers or electronics?
15- Have you ever been abroad? And do you have any relatives who live abroad?
16- Can you speak any foreign language?
17- Do you know how to use a gun?
18- Do you have any health problems?
19- Have you ever been in (a relation with the) other terrorist organizations?
20- Could you briefly give information about your background?
21- How did you find out about the organization?
22- What are your good and bad behaviors?
23- Have you ever been in police custody? Did you give any information about
the organization to the police?
24- Do you know the purpose of the organization? Did you read the organization’s
written materials?
25- To you, what is the meaning of the organization?
26- Can you accept every kind of duty without questioning?
27- Why did you join the organization? What was the reason that you are a
member of the PKK?
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28- What is your area of expertise in the organization, or which part of the
organization are you working in?
29- Could you make a judgment about your team leader?
30- Could you make a judgment about your subordinates?

Research Question

This study seeks to answer following research question:
What are the socio-demographic and motivational differences between active participants
and supporters in the PKK terrorist organization?
Organization of the Study
The first chapter of this study gives the information about definition of terrorism,
core characteristics of ethnic terrorism, the origins of Kurds, PKK, the problem
statement, purpose of the study, significance of the study and research question. This
study aims to analyze the socio demographic and motivational differences active
participants and supporters in PKK terrorist organization.
The second chapter reviews the literature about this topic. This chapter identifies
the variables about this subject, and analyzes how scholars applied the differential
association theory, relative deprivation theory and frustration-aggression theory on their
studies.
The third chapter is about methodology of the research. This study is an
exploratory study and cross sectional research design is used. The required data is
obtained by biographies of the terrorists.
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The fourth chapter is about findings and discussions. The fifth chapter includes
theoretical and policy implications and conclusion.
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CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

Terrorism has been one of the primary problems and concerns of people around
the world for decades. Throughout history people have deeply felt terrorism on a local,
personal level after experiencing loss of their loved ones, or on the other hand, they
sometimes ignored it when they watched highly publicized terrorist events on television.
However, terrorism has never become a principal global priority until the 9/11 attacks.
Today, it is obvious that terrorism is a universal problem that attracts attention more than
ever.
Terrorism has been proven to work even though some governments claimed that it
is an inefficient tool for political change (Hoffman, 1999). Terrorism works because, as a
result of terrorist activities, the terrorists usually manage to at least partially implement
their plans, which could range from damaging a country economically and politically to a
revolution leading a complete political system change.
The terrorist organization known as the Kurdish Workers Party, or the PKK, seeks
via the ruthless application of terror to establish a separate Kurdish state. Advancing the
spurious argument that Kurds cannot fully express themselves in democratic Turkey,
these separatist terrorists seek to divide Turkey along ethnic lines.
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Studies on terrorism often suffer from insufficient volunteer participants,
inadequate sample size, and unreliable and invalid data collection. Therefore, most
studies in this field employ secondary data in their analysis. The studies are mostly
descriptive case studies that include limited analysis and are written from the military
point of view.
Byman (1998) points out the general limitations of the study of ethnic terrorism.
He divides these limitations in two parts. First, rather than analyzing the symbolic value
of political violence, scholars merely focus on the materialist goals of political violence.
Secondly, scholars can make a mistake in lumping together all forms of terrorism, such as
ideological terrorism. Counter terror policies can backfire without a clear distinction
between different types of terrorist groups. Byman (1998) also mentions that each
terrorist group has a different characteristic nature in the establishment of relationships
with people in different countries. Scholars also ignore the creation of a strong ethnic
identity and they mainly just focus on the political nature of ethnic terrorism.
Terrorism theories can be divided in four categories: (a) strategic theories; (b)
structural theories; (c) psychological theories and (d) sociological theories. Terrorism is
seen with different points of view in each of these different approaches. In Strategic
theories, terrorism is a tool to achieve a set of goals recognized by rational actors; in
structural theories, terrorism is the result of the internal dynamics of political
organizations; in psychological and sociological theories, the main elements of terrorism
are individual factors such as personality, gender, age, education, and political affiliation
(Yilmaz, 2009).
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These four sets of theories have some applications for this research but, especially in
strategic and structural theories, the main focus is the “terrorist act”. Psychological and
sociological theories mainly focus on the individuals and individual characteristics. Both of
these approaches attempt to identify psychological and sociological factors that lead
terrorists to participate in terrorist acts. Both of these theories which focus on the individual
factors offer different explanations in relation to an individual’s choice to engage in
terrorism. However, psychological theories use the behavioral approach and believe in an
atypical terrorist personality, while sociological theories highlight demographic factors such
as age, gender, education, and social class.
Nonetheless, Ross (1996; 1999) disagrees with this approach, as psychological
perspectives unsuccessfully attempt to find a pathological element in the terrorist
personality.

According to David Long, former assistant director of the State

Department's Office of Counter Terrorism, there is no terrorist personality, but terrorists
characteristically suffer from low self-esteem, are attracted to groups with charismatic
leaders, and enjoy risk-taking (Long 1990). Ineffective parenting or rebellion against
one's parents, a pathological need for absolutism, and a variety of other "syndromes" and
hypotheses were the investigated sampling of psychological factors (Margolin, 1977).
For more than two decades, through research and theoretical assumption, scholars
have tried to identify what makes terrorists “different,” and “perhaps the best documented
generalization is negative: terrorists do not show any striking psychopathology”
(McCauley, 1989). Crenshaw (1981) asserts that "the outstanding common characteristic
of terrorists is their normality" (p. 390), and Silke (1998) has concluded that “most
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serious researchers in the field at least nominally agree with the position that terrorists are
essentially normal individuals” (p.53).
Merari (1990) provides a good synopsis for psychological approaches. He says,
“As far as we know, most terrorists feel that they are doing nothing wrong when they kill
and injure people. They seem to share a feature of the psychological condition known as
antisocial personality disorder or psychopathic personality disorder, which is reflected by
an absence of empathy for the suffering of others. However, they do not appear unstable
or mentally ill for this. A common feature is a type of thinking such as “I am good and
right. You are bad and wrong.” It is a very polarized thinking which allows them to
distance themselves from opponents and makes it easier for them to kill people. It is not
the same kind of simplistic thinking one would expect from someone with low
intelligence or moral development. Most terrorists are of above average intelligence and
have sophisticated ethical and moral development. A closed-minded certainty is a
common feature of terrorist thinking.” (Merari 1990)
As Schmid and Jongman (1988) noted, “The chief assumption underlying many
psychological ‘theories’…is that the terrorist in one way or the other not normal and that
the insights from psychology and psychiatry are adequate keys to understanding.” In
reality, psychopathology has proven to be, at best, only a modest risk factor for general
violence, and all but irrelevant to understanding terrorism. In fact, “the idea of terrorism
as the product of mental disorder or psychopathy has been discredited” (Crenshaw,
1992).
The psychological approach has received two important criticisms. First, Laquer
(1999) and Wilkinson (1998) assert that there is no profile of the terrorist. In their
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opinion, geography and time can affect the profiles of terrorists. In Laquer’s (1999) view,
however, some scholars can easily talk about the ages of terrorists as, whether young or
old, their psychological characteristics can be different across different cultures. White
(2002) says it is not possible to identify a single terrorist profile because of different
individual personalities.
Second, the limited accessibility of research subjects is another problem for
psychological profile studies. Israel (1997) underlines that most of the terrorist
personality studies that exist are based on historical analysis of biographical information.
Terrorist profiling was created by combining or merging psychology with
sociology (and criminal justice) (Russell and Miller 1977; Bell 1982; Galvin 1983;
Strentz 1988; Hudson 1999). According to Russell and Miller (1977) the characteristics
of the people who have a potential to join terrorist organizations are:


“22-25 years of age



80% male, with women in support roles



75-80% single



66% middle or upper class background



66% some college or graduate work



42% previous participation in working class advocacy groups



17% unemployed



18% strong religious beliefs”
However the accessibility of a research subject is also a problem for

psychological profiling. Meanwhile, sociological profiling variables (demographical
variables) can be found from government authorities or published biographies of
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terrorists. Therefore, social profiling is more accepted as a reliable strategy (Hermann,
1997).
The sociological approach was used in this study because of the limitations of the
psychological approach. The researcher does not have a chance to establish direct contact
with terrorists but has access to secondary data sources. So the researchers can collect the
data about sociological characteristics and backgrounds of terrorists. In order to
understand which variables were examined, the literature of sociological theories will be
reviewed in previous studies
Sociological Theories
Sociology is one of the important disciplines that offer successful analytical and
theoretical tools to explore, analyze and understand events in an individual’s social life. It
provides better understanding of the realities around them, and with the assistance of the
theoretical perspectives of sociology, scholars have a chance to easily see social realities
in their purest form (Cinoglu, 2010).
Human behavior can be varying due to the effect of external influences. However,
sociological theories help scholars in that some behaviors can be modeled and predicted
(Lailari, 2009). Silke (2004) comments that, “The activities of terrorist groups and the
nature of their membership, have by and large been studiously ignored by social
scientists.”
Sociological theories can be analyzed in four parts in terrorism studies. These are:
sociological profiling, social learning theory of aggression, frustration-aggression theory,
and relative deprivation theory.
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Instead of offering a theoretical explanation of terrorism, social profiling mainly
focuses on common sociological attributes of terrorists (age, gender, education, and
social class). Profiling is a basic way of understanding the relationship between terrorism
and demographic attributes. Reporting demographics with some processes of terrorism
such as “joining in a terrorist organization” and “engaging (involvement) in a terrorist
act” provide a meaningful relationship (Yilmaz, 2009). Therefore, this study focuses on
the relation between different involvement levels of terrorists and socio-demographic
variables.
The differential association theory suggests that observation and imitation of an
aggressive role model are vital for a violent result. Frustration-aggression theory asserts
that desperation, which occurs in the expression of oppression, results in political
violence. Finally, relative deprivation theory assumes that if there is a gap between
expectation and actual achievement, political violence results. With related studies and
evidence about each one as presented, a sociological explanation will be provided to assist
in getting a better understanding of the sociological characteristics of terrorists.
Example Studies
An early study of terrorist characteristics was written by Merkulov who studied
1600 terrorists in Russia in 1870 (Young, 1980). He used several variables such as age,
educational attainment, social status, and geographical origin in order to find the potential
recruitment grounds such as universities (Yilmaz, 2009).
Young (1980) conducted a statistical analysis based on a group of 355 activists by
using different variables such as gender, father’s occupation, birth date, province of birth,
educational attainment, occupation of self, entry date, and arrest history from the terrorist
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biographies. According to his study, he could not find a common terrorist profile which
helps to distinguish these individuals from members of a non-terrorist group.

His

sampling technique is different from that of other scholars because he used the
autobiographies of people who prefer to turn to violence from a populist movement.
Russel and Miller (1977) studied more than 350 terrorists of Argentinian,
Brazilian, German, Iranian, Irish, Italian, Japanese, Pelestanian, Spanish, Turkish and
Uruguayan origins. The data was collected from published data sources.
Weinberg and Eubank (1987) focused on the profiles of Italian terrorists. They
gathered the information about 2512 terrorists from two major newspapers in Italy and
from court files. They identified biographical characteristics of Italian terrorists such as
sex, age, place of birth, place of residence, role in the organization, group affiliation,
nature of relationship to other terrorists, occupation prior to becoming terrorist, and
membership to political organizations prior to becoming a terrorist.
Handler (1990) analyzed the socioeconomic profile of 280 American terrorists
that were active in the United States in the 1960s and 1970s, by looking at their
biographies. Handler (1990) used education, religion, race, occupation, income, and
parents’ occupation in order to identify socio-economic variables. Handler’s (1990) study
of right and left wing terrorists was helpful in understanding reasons why people choose
to join in specific groups.
Clark (1983) studied the profiles of ETA (Euzkadi ta Askatasuna) members. The
related data consisted of profiles of about 495 people. In his study, Clark (1983) used age,
sex, and socioeconomic background of members and families, and the ethnic and
linguistic characteristics of ETA terrorists, radicalization of Basque youth, recruitment,
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relationship with families, friends, and loved ones, and leaving the organization as
variables.
Hassan (2001) interviewed almost 250 members of Hamas and the Islamic Jihad
in Gaza between 1996 and 1999. The interviewed terrorists were participants in
attempted suicide attacks but failed to complete the attack as planned. Her data collection
method was exceptional because it is nearly unable to access the terrorists; therefore, her
study has been extensively cited. (Krueger & Malecková, 2003; Newman, 2006; Silke,
2004; Victoroff, 2005).
Pedahzur et al. (2003) studied 819 terrorists (743 of them non-suicide and 80 of
them suicide terrorists) and compared suicide and non-suicide terrorists from different
terrorist organizations between 1993 and 2002. They collected data from an Israeli daily
newspaper (Ha‘aretz). In their study, they used different variables such as previous
experiences in terrorism acts, education, ideological affiliation, marital status, age, socioeconomic background, and gender. The main discussion in relation to their study was the
reliability of data sources. According to Sageman (2004), in order to take care of the
reliability issue of data sources researchers have to triangulate or confirm the same
information from another data source.
Sageman (2004) studied 172 Salafi Mujahidin persons, and in doing so gathered
data from the documents and transcripts of legal proceedings, government documents and
press, academic and internet articles. In his study, Sageman (2004) used different
variables, such as social background as measured by social origin, education, socioeconomic status, occupation, family status; psychological background as measured by
mental illness and terrorist personality (pathological narcissism, paranoia, and
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authoritarian personality); circumstances of joining the jihad as measured by age, place of
recruitment, faith, employment, and relative deprivation; and social affiliation as
measured by friendship, kinship, discipleship, and worship. Sageman (2004) also used a
social network analysis of the global Salafi Mujahidin and the characteristics of this
network.
Berrebi (2004) studied the biographies of 335 terrorists (285 killed and 50
Palestinian Islamic Jihad leaders) from the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and Hamas that
he retrieved from their online sources in order to understand the potential link between
terrorism and economic desperation; as well as the differences between terrorists from
Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and the general population of Palestine.
His data set included age, poverty status, education, marital status, resident type (rural vs.
urban), and district of residence. The main limitation of his study was accuracy of the
biographic information because of the data source. Additionally, there was no clear
information about poverty status in the terrorists’ biographies. Therefore, the researcher
constructed this variable by looking at the individuals’ occupation, foreign travel history,
car ownership, and computer availability.
Reinares (2004) analyzed the social and demographic characteristics of ETA
militants. He collected the data of over 600 individuals from the national courts, and
conducted semi-structured and taped individual interviews with former ETA militants.
Alkan (2007) studied the PKK terrorist organization. In his study, he used 216
autobiographies of PKK militants who were killed by security forces. He gathered the
data from the internet website of the terrorist organization.
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Jacques and Taylor (2008) analyzed the differences between motivations and
recruitments of male and female terrorists in their study. Their dependent variables are
motivations and recruitments, and the independent variables are: Religious/Nationalistic
reasons, key events (the individual’s psychological response to events and circumstances
that were beyond their control, for example, the death of a family member or friend),
revenge, personal reasons (low self-esteem, depression, isolation from society, shame and
dishonor, and monetary problems), religious/group pressure, peer pressure, proactive
seeking, and exploitation. They collated the data from the Internet and used content
analysis for their study.
Findings of Previous Studies
Age
According to the findings of previous studies, if age increases, the possibility of
joining the terrorist organization also decreases. (Clark, 1983; Russel & Miller, 1977).
However, terrorists have a tendency to be young, and the age trend is changeable in
different terrorist organizations (Yilmaz, 2009).
Russel & Miller (1977) studied more than 350 profiles of Argentinian, Brazilian,
German, Iranian, Irish, Italian, Japanese, Pelestanian, Spanish, Turkish and Uruguayan
terrorists. According to them, the average age of the terrorists was between 22 and 25.
Taylor (1988) also identifies that the terrorists’ age is in the early twenties in his study.
Laqueur (1988) mentions that Arab and Iranian terrorist groups use 14-15 year old boys
for their attacks because they are not suspicious and they do not question orders (Hudson,
1999).
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Reinares (2004) analyzed the social and demographic characteristics of ETA
militants. He collected the data of over 600 individuals from the national courts and
conducted semi-structured and taped individual interviews with former ETA militants.
According to his findings, ETA militants joined the terrorist organization between the last
year of their teens and the start of their twenties. Clark (1983) found nearly similar results
in his study. According to his findings, ETA members were in their middle or late
twenties when they joined the ETA.
Alkan (2007) studied the PKK terrorist organization. In his study he used 216
autobiographies of PKK militants who were killed by security forces. He gathered the
data from the internet website of the terrorist organization. According to his findings,
77.4% of PKK members joined the terrorist organization when they were 14-25, and
18.1% between 26-35. These findings also supported Cantekin’s (2006) study. In his
study he used the data about 97 PKK convicts who either surrendered to or were arrested
by law enforcement agencies.
However, a person can join a terrorist organization at any age in his life, although
younger people can easily take risks. On the other hand, older terrorists have a chance to
analyze the situation; hence, they can be more willing to join the organization (Yilmaz,
2009). As a result, the relationship of age and participation is not clear.
Gender
Most terrorist activities are male oriented (Grimland et al., 2006). Nearly 80
percent of terrorist attacks were carried out by males between 1966-76. Female terrorists
comprised less than 16 percent in Latin America’s terror groups. The general tendency of
the female role in terrorist organizations is that women have a secondary support role
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such as intelligence collection, serving as couriers or nurses, and maintaining safehouses
(Russel&Miller, 1977; Hudson, 1999). Especially, the ETA prefers women in a support
role (Clark, 1983). On the other hand, they also assert that primarily in several European
terrorist groups there have been a large number of women members. For example, onethird of the terrorists were women in the RAF and the June Second Movement.
During the 1970s and 80s, Latin American and Western European terrorist
organizations had a large group of female members, such as 30 percent in the Sandinista
National Liberation Front (FSLN); one-third of the Farabundo Martí National Liberation
Front (FMLN) in El Salvador; and one-half of the Shining Path terrorists in Peru
(Hudson, 1999). Weinberg and Eubank (1987) mention the role of females in Italian
terrorist organizations. They studied 2512 individuals who were arrested or wanted by the
police between 1970 and 1984. According to their findings, 18 percent of those groups
were female. Among those females, 7 percent played leadership roles and 66 percent
were active regulars who joined terrorist attacks. According to Mac Donald (1992), of 22
core activist group members of the RAF, 13 were women, and in 1991, 50 percent of
total RAF members were women, while 80 percent were again women RAF supporters.
Hudson (1999) also mentions that on Germany’s wanted list 5 were women (the list had a
total of 8 people) and among 22 people hunted by the police, 1 was a woman in 1991.
Females have bigger roles in left wing terrorist organizations than in right wing
terrorist organizations. According to Handler (1990), left wing American terrorist groups
consist of 54 percent males and 46 percent females. On the other hand, in right wing
terrorist groups in America, 89 percent were male and 11 percent were female. Russel &
Miller (1977) and Weinberg & Eubank (1987) reported the same path in their studies.
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In suicide attacks, 30-40% of the attacks from the LTTE, 75% of the bombings by
the PKK, and nearly half of the attacks from the SSNP were carried out by women
(Beyler, 2003; Fleming, 2006). The reasons why women were chosen for those attacks
included the capacity to deceive security officials, as well as the stronger psychological
impact of their actions (Schweitzer, 2001). Especially in the PKK and LTTE, women are
considered equals and get the same training as men (Beyler, 2003). Suicide missions
provide women with an opportunity to show themselves as equal to men, and rebuild
their self-esteem and public image for those women who are victims of rape (Beyler,
2003).
Some researchers argued that female terrorists have different reasons and
motivations from male terrorists. Jacques and Taylor (2008) analyzed the differences
between motivations and recruitments of male and female terrorists in their study. Their
dependent variables are motivations and recruitments, and their independent variables
are: Religious/Nationalistic reasons, key events (individual’s psychological response to
events and circumstances that were beyond their control, for example, the death of a
family member or friend), revenge, personal reasons (low self-esteem, depression,
isolation from society, shame and dishonor, and monetary problems), religious/group
pressure, peer pressure, proactive seeking, and exploitation. They collated data from the
Internet and used content analysis for their study. According to their findings, female
terrorists will less often be associated with religious/nationalistic motivations; females
will be more frequently associated with personal motivations for carrying out suicide
terrorism. Additionally some family problems have a great role for females being
members of terrorist organizations. According to Galvin (1983), unlike males, women
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join the terrorist organization for “promises of a better life for their children and the
desire to meet people’s needs that are not being met by an intractable establishment,”
rather than for “power and glory”. As per the result of these studies, when we look at the
terrorism generally and terrorist attacks, women‘s involvement still remains particularly
low.
Marital Status
An

unmarried

terrorist

is

very

important

for

terrorist

organizations

(Russel&Miller, 1977; Hudson, 1999; Sageman, 2004; Yilmaz, 2009). In Russell and
Miller’s (1977) study, according to arrest statistics, 75 to 80 percent of terrorists were
single. The reasons for being single in terrorist organizations are mobility, flexibility,
reduced family responsibilities, initiative, security, being too young and being financially
unable to afford a marriage. (Hudson, 1999; Sageman, 2004; Yilmaz, 2009). Due to these
reasons terrorist organizations prefer to use married members to perform secondary
duties (Hudson, 1999).
On the other hand, in Sageman’s (2004) study, it was found that 75 percent of
Salafi Mujahidin members were married. However, he accepted that those findings were
unique for that group (religious oriented group), and it is parallel to normal Islam beliefs.
In conclusion, previous studies show that unmarried terrorists belong to leftist
groups, while married terrorists belong to religious based terrorist organizations.
However, there were no strong bonds between an involvement in a terrorist act and
marital status, although married members who have family responsibilities tend not to
join terrorist activities so often because of the risk of being arrested and they prefer lowprofile terrorist activities (Yilmaz, 2009).
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Education
Generally, terrorists have more than average education. Russell and Miller (1977)
found that nearly two-thirds of terrorists had some form of university training. As an
example, 80 percent Germany’s June Second Movement and Baader-Meinhof Gang
members were students from the University of Berlin. Yet, any education level cannot
identify terrorists. For example, the 17 November Revolutionary Organization (17N)
members are highly educated, while the FARC, the LTTE, and the PKK members are
peasant girls and boys. Additionally, most terrorists are well educated except for Abu
Nidal who is a relatively uneducated leader of the old generation (Hudson, 1999).
Hudson (1999) also asserts that, “the level of intelligence of a terrorist group’s leaders
may determine the longevity of the group.”
According to Alkan (2007), among the PKK members, 11% were university
graduates or students, 16% were high school graduates or students, 13% were secondary
school graduates and 39% were primary school graduates. Additionally, the Sociologic
and Strategic Studies Foundation studied 1003 PKK members in 1994-1996, and this
study shows that among the PKK members 4.3% had a university degree, 14.4% had a
high school degree, 12.3% had a secondary degree, 47.2% had a primary school degree.
After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, terrorism scholars focused not only on the type of
education but also the level of education of terrorists (Yilmaz, 2009). Sageman’s (2004)
study of the global Salafi Mujahidin revealed that 17 percent of terrorists had joined the
religious schools, and most of them received a secular education in elementary and
secondary schools. Sageman (2004) also believes that a low level of education, which in
turn makes terrorists vulnerable to brainwashing by religious extremists, does not
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establish a link with participation in terrorism. With the parallel of this idea he finds that
almost 71 percent of terrorists from the global Salafi Mujahidin had a college or graduate
degree.
Kruger and Maleckova (2003) studied political violence among Palestinians
against the Israeli civilians. In this case, the authors found that the support for political
violence against Israeli civilians consisted of 39 percent from people who had a
secondary education, and 32 percent from people who had no education.
This pattern cannot be seen in all studies. Russell and Miller (1977) stated that
nearly none of the terrorists from the Provisional Wing of the Irish Republican Army
(IRA) had higher educational levels. American leftist terrorists had a higher level of
college degree than rightist ones (75 vs 22 percent). Previous studies did not mention any
relationship between the levels of education and involvement.
Occupation
The occupations of terrorist recruits have varied widely, and there does not appear
to be any occupation in particular that produces terrorists, other than the ranks of the
unemployed and students (Hudson, 2002). According to findings of Russel and Miller’s
(1977) study, between 50 and 70 percent of the younger members of Latin American
urban terrorist groups were students. Additionally, Palestanian terrorists had high profile
jobs and a university degree. Sageman (2004) asserts that 42 percent of the Salafi
mujahidin had high-profile jobs (physicians, architects, and teachers); 33 percent had
semi-skilled jobs (police, military, civil service, and students); and 25 percent were
unemployed.
Weinberg and Eubank (1987) found that 27 percent of Italian terrorists were
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students; 26 percent were laborers; 15 percent were white-collar workers; and 7 percent
were professionals (e.g., architects, lawyers, journalists, and physicians). Handler (1990)
found a different pattern between American right wing and left wing terrorists. However,
among the American right-wing terrorists, 75 percent had blue-collar jobs, and 18 percent
had white-collar jobs; while among American left-wing terrorists, only 24 had blue-collar
jobs, while 39 percent had white-collar jobs.
Place of Recruitment (Rural versus Urban)
Because of the advantage to be gained by having knowledge of a specific area and
local contacts, terrorist groups prefer to recruit members in the areas where they focus
their operations. Hence, terrorist organizations focus on the target areas, be they urban or
rural based organizations. Location is a significant factor in regard to the decision making
process for recruitment of potential members (Yilmaz, 2009). This idea was supported by
previous researches.
Russell and Miller (1977) stated that most terrorists in Latin American, European
and Palestinian terrorist organizations were urban based and new recruitments also joined
from urban areas. Weinberg and Eubank (1987) also studied urban-based neo-fascist and
leftist terrorist groups and stated that 65 percent of the recruited Italian terrorists were
from big cities.

Big cities have an advantage of housing people who are mobile,

including immigrants; therefore, nearly half of the terrorists were recruited from there.
Clark’s (1983) studied ETA, a rural based terrorist organization based in Spain. His
findings indicate that ETA recruits members among the workers from small industrial
towns in Basque, Spain.
Based on past studies there is no indication of differential involvement in
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terrorism activities and the place of recruitment. In Turkey, most of the terrorists who
joined from the urban cities may have a rural family background. Additionally, it is easy
to find people in big cities from all over the Turkey. People can migrate to big cities
because of education, work etc. In the big cities, these people can come together and
create neighborhoods and they want to continue their life style in there by living
according to their culture. Therefore, PKK members are not concerned with recruiting
new people from urban or rural places (Ekici & Phelps, 2008)
Socioeconomic Status
Russel & Miller (1977) found out that most of the terrorists they studied were
from upper or middle class backgrounds except for PKK, LTTE and FARC members.
Clark (1983) mentioned that the ETA is a rural based terrorist organization with members
from the lower class. In Hassan’s study, it was also found that 250 Palestanian suicide
bombers who were interviewed were not poor. Berribi (2004) also supports this idea and
found that among 48 suicide bombers from Hamas and Palestinian groups, none of them
came from poor families.
According to Sageman’s (2004) study, three-fourths of terrorists among salafi
mujahidins were from the middle and upper class and most of them were originally from
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Egypt and Syria. Others from middle and lower classes especially
originated from Indonesia, Malaysia, and Algeria.
Constructing a socioeconomic variable is very difficult in terrorism studies. Most
terrorism studies do not seek the involvement level; they just focus on the reasons that
lead terrorists to join the terrorist organization. Yilmaz’s (2009) study was unique in that
it looked at involvement levels of DHKP/C and Hizbullah members in Turkey. He also

41

could not find a significant result with regard to socioeconomic status. To construct the
socioeconomic variable information in respect to income level is very important. PKK
members do not want to divulge their true income level because they do not want to pay
any taxes. Additionally, their families join some smuggling activities so they have more
income coming in illegally. If a socioeconomic variable is used in this study, the results
will be wrong and not statistically significant. Therefore, a socioeconomic variable will
not be used in this study to avoid erroneous results.
Degree of Involvement
There is a misleading tendency for scholars to investigate a common terrorist
identity. However, many have realized that terrorists have a different process and
experience of becoming such, as well as with respect to participating in terrorist acts and
leading a terrorist organization. As an example, Victoroff (2005) points out that the
impact of some personality attributes such as being extrovert and hostile or neurotic in
regard to becoming a terrorist are aimed at providing measurement in the psychological
profiling studies of terrorist characteristics (Yilmaz, 2009).
Hudson (2002) asserts that “it may be misleading to consider terrorists as
―former professionals” (p.49). Many terrorists can participate in terrorist activities when
they receive an order and keep their terrorist identity secret while they perform their duty
for the organization. Hudson (2002) also asserts that this creates certain backup positions
and supportive missions named sleeping commandos that are meant to escape police
arrests. On the other hand, in the RAF and Red Brigades terrorist organizations, terrorism
is a full-time profession. In Turkey, the general practice is that all terrorist organizations
use non-professional, part-time members for missions.
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It is necessary to identify the differences between those groups to understand how
involvement level works in the terrorist life. As Figure-1 illustrates, there are 3 different
degrees of involvement in terrorist organizations, namely the leaders, active participants
and supporters.

Leaders
Professionals
ls

Active Participants
Professionals

Sympathizers
Non-Professionals

Figure 1: Involvement Level of Terrorists

Leaders control the terrorist organizations, give the orders, make plans for
terrorist attacks, decide on the principles and policies, accept the new members’
applications, decide on the penalties to impose in case of transgression, and also decide
on how to use the money that belongs to the organization. Leaders are a group of people
and they make decisions and give orders via a top-down system. One of these leaders is
so powerful that the terrorist organization can be called with that leader’s name. Leaders
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generally keep their identities secret as they are the most important target for
governments. They are full-time terrorists.
The second group is active participants. They are the armed wing of the terrorist
organization and they carry out the terrorist attacks. In the PKK, active participants have
to get military training. These training camps are located in the Northern part of the Iraq
(Kandil Mountain). Active participants are full-time terrorists. They live in the
mountainous area in the south eastern part of Turkey. They just come to cities when they
carry out terrorist attacks. Afterward, they return to the mountains or the northern part of
the Iraq. They do not have any jobs or family ties. Therefore, they need some support
when they stay inside the cities.
The third group is supporters. They have a support role such as intelligence
collection, serving as couriers or nurses, maintaining safe houses, and organizing
demonstrations. They have a normal life, with families and jobs, and live in urban areas.
Nobody knows of their relationship with the terrorist organization. They live a normal
life until they get an assignment from the leadership. According to Bodansky, terrorist
organizations need 35-50 supporters for every active participant.
The main aim of this study is that there is not the best profile for a typical
terrorist. Certain sociological factors have a different role depending on the level of
involvement in terrorist life. There are factors other than instructions that affect choice of
an individual for involvement in terrorist activities, such as being a school dropout, the
death or arrest of family members, and unemployment.
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Differential Association Theory
According to this theory, terrorism is learned like other human behaviors (Akers
& Silverman, 2004). According to this point of view, rather than the result of
dysfunctional personality traits such as deprivation, hopelessness, and frustration,
terrorism is outcome of social, economic, and political influences (Schmid, 2005). Some
of the scholars accept terrorism as a function of learned ideological values (Crenshaw,
1988; Hudson, 2002)
From the learning perspective, terrorists are accepted as rational individuals.
Therefore, the psychological typology with terrorists is not acceptable, because the
mental illness idea is not usable for terrorists and non-terrorists. Additionally, the
psychological perspective prefers to overlook social processes by which terrorist
behaviors are learned like any other human behaviors. The basic assumptions of the
social learning theory are presented next to understanding in what way the theory differs
from relative deprivation and frustration-aggression.
Basic Assumptions and Versions of Differential Association
This theory tries to explain how deviant and criminal behaviors are obtained,
maintained and changed with the help of a set of theories. It attempts to identify the
social and cultural factors of crime, deviance and conformity. However, relative
deprivation and frustration-aggression focus on the social structure, while the differential
association theory of terrorism focuses on the social processes. In other words, relative
deprivation and frustration-aggression try to explain, “why certain feelings and attitudes
that promote terrorism emerge, differential association explains how people espouse
these feelings and attitudes and why they result in terrorism. Differential Association was
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examined by both psychologists and sociologists to understand how people learn what
they do” (Yilmaz, 2009).
This study is interested in whether differential association can be applicable to
terrorist behaviors just like it was applied to other human behaviors. Following this,
differential association perspectives are reviewed to project the social processes by which
deviant behaviors are learned and to lay the foundation for research hypotheses.

Edwin Sutherland’s Differential Association
According to Sutherland, “Criminology is the body of knowledge regarding
delinquency and crime as a social phenomena. It includes within its scope the process of
making laws, breaking laws, and of reacting toward the breaking of laws. These
processes are three aspects of a somewhat unified sequence of interactions. The objective
of criminology is the development of a body of general and verified and principles and of
other types of knowledge regarding this process of law, crime, and reaction to crime”
(Sutherland, 1974).
Sutherland prefers to work “why” rather than “what” multiple factors such as
social class, age, gender, race, urban or rural location, and the biological factors of an
individual that motivate crime (Cullen & Agnew, 2006). Sutherland (1947) asserts that
the excess of definitions favorable to deviance over definitions unfavorable to violation
of law enforces a person to become a deviant while associating with other persons.
Criminal behavior is learnable and learned in interaction with other criminal persons.
Criminals learn not only techniques of certain crimes, but also a specific rationale,
motives and so on. Differential association theory explains why any individual moves to
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criminal behavior. On the other hand, that does not mean that all interactions with
criminals cause criminal behavior. It may change depending on the individual and social
environment.
Differential association theory is based on nine principles;
“1. Criminal behavior is learned.
*Not inborn, or predetermined
* Anyone can learn
2. Criminal behavior is learned in interaction with other persons in a process of communication.
* Includes gestures
* Verbal interactions
3. The principal part of the learning of criminal behavior occurs within intimate personal
groups.
*Work environments
*Peer networks
*Media plays role
4. When criminal behavior is learned, the learning includes (a) techniques of committing the
crime, which are sometimes very complicated, sometimes very simple; (b) the specific
direction of motives, drives, rationalizations, and attitudes.
5. The specific direction of motives and drives is learned from definitions of the legal codes
as favorable or unfavorable.
6. A person becomes delinquent because of an excess of definitions favorable to violation of
law over definitions unfavorable to violation of law.
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7. Differential associations may vary in frequency, duration, priority, and intensity.
8. The process of learning criminal behavior by association with criminal and anti-criminal
patterns involves all of the mechanisms that are involved in any other learning.
9. While criminal behavior is an expression of general needs and values, it is not explained
by those general needs and values since non-criminal behavior is an expression of the same
needs and values” (Cullen & Agnew, 2006).
These principles try to explain the steps that force an individual to become a
criminal. A person has observed their environment and gathered information since
childhood. In this learning period, which goes on until the end of life, information is
received not only from family members but also from social environments. Information
can support or oppose the criminal behavior. Additionally, society is another important
factor of criminal behavior, because definitions favorable to violation of law and
unfavorable to violation of law in a society can be changeable. Finally, cultural meaning
is also a vital part of criminality. This includes motives, rationalizations, and attitudes
that might lead someone to commit crime.
Although many scholars accepted Sutherland’s theory, there are some criticisms.
For example, in the first place, Sutherland failed to give an adequate description of
definitions favorable and unfavorable to crime. According to theory, it is claimed that
criminal behavior is learned in the process of interaction with other persons. Therefore,
the definitions of the activities, which are accepted as crime, are very important. Some
individuals may hold beliefs that justify or excuse crime in certain situations, however,
some individuals completely approve of crime. Interaction with those persons who have
different values and beliefs may influence individuals differently.
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The second criticism of differential association theory is that it fails to fully
describe the process by which crime is learned. The theory simply indicates that one
becomes delinquent after some processes, but these processes do not fully answer the
question of “how” this happens. In other words, how the system works in this process is
not clear because some individuals may not become a criminal by going through the same
process. Sutherland’s (1947) theory lacks any psychological explanation about how
learning occurs.
Empirical Support of Differential Association Theory
Merari et.al. (1989) analyse the basic causes of the Palestinian Intifada, the
general background and precipitating events, and its course of development in their study.
While speaking of “a psychological angle,” Merari et. Al. (1989) point out the new
Palestinian generation created in the period of twenty years after Israel conquered the
West Bank and Gaza Strip. According to Merari et. al. (1989), the first generation grew
up under Jordanian rule in the West Bank and under Egyptian rule in Gaza. They were
used to harsh responses from the rulers and they were careful about not going against the
authorities. But, the second generation only knew about the Israeli occupation, and these
people were not able to compare it to the previous harsher regimes. Their perceptions
were in accordance with what they had learned in their life experiences; so they were not
afraid of challenging the authorities.
Merari et.al. (1989) also speak of the practical results of the prisoner swap
conducted in May 1985. The Israeli government released 1,150 convicted terrorists to
free three Israeli soldiers held by Gibril’s Population Front. Due to this exchange, the
young Palestinian generation learned that they can even avoid long prison sentences, and
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the punishment is not guaranteed. Most of the released Palestinians took an active part in
teaching the new generation about the struggle.
Aho (1990) argues that most of the individuals who become part of the political
extremist movements are led in by social bonds to friends, family members and
significant others who have joined the movement. The group becomes their "extended
family and indoctrination" continues in this new family.
Sageman (2004) examines how people join four specific terrorist networks: the
Central Staff around Osama bin Laden, the Core Arabs, the Maghreb Arabs, and the
Southeast Asians. Sageman (2004) studied the background, recruitment, and motivations
of more than 150 members of these networks. He found that a social network "provides
social and psychological security" for the likely members. According to Sageman (2004),
individuals join these movements for the following reasons: 68% due to pre-existing
friendships; 20% due to kinship; and 10% due to discipleship.
Family is another factor that plays an important role. Singer (2006) speaks of
certain terrorist groups such as the LTTE, Hamas and Jamiat Islami in Pakistan that give
special recognition and honors to the families of the young suicide bombers. Hamas in
Palestine even celebrates the child's martyrdom with festivities. Through these festivals
and joyful scenes, young individuals learn what to do to be a respected person in their
society. Losing a son or daughter to the cause is a point of pride for the families and this
interpretation encourages more children to join the jihad.
In his illegal book, Uysal (2001) asserts that the influence of the family and
relatives is another factor that leads individuals to join a terrorist organization. Young
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individuals may learn from arrested relatives or from uncles who are fighting in the
mountains for the "cause" and the organization.
Peer relations are an important factor in joining terrorist organizations. In his
book, Alkan (2002) reflects the life story of Berrin Bickilar and how her friends affected
her life. Berrin explains why she joined the organization as follows: "I joined the
organization, because they showed me attention, their appreciative and trustworthy
approaches and intersection of those approaches with my pursuits.”
The pressure to engage in suicide terrorism may also come in the form of peer or
familial pressure (Post, Sprinzak, and Denny, 2003). For example, Sageman found that
for 68% of terrorists, preexisting friendship bonds play an important role in formal
integration into the extremist group (Sageman, 2004). In many cases, a friend or
acquaintance in the group recruited the subject. Similarly, 75% of terrorists were found to
have preexisting familial bonds with members already involved in terrorist organizations,
or joined as a group with friends or relatives (Sageman, 2004). Such kinship links have
also been identified in the recruitment of women. In a study of the Egyptian religious
militant group Repentance and Holy Flight, analyses revealed that female terrorists were
mostly relatives or wives of the male members (Ibrahim, 1980). An example of the role
of kinship bonds can be seen in the Hamburg cell that was responsible for the 9/11
bombings. Intensive interaction between friends and peers resulted in the radicalization of
ideologies, the formation of strong in-group bonds, and the absence of extra-group bonds
(Taarnby, 2005).
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Serxwebun (freedom) is one of the illegal periodicals of the PKK. In Serxwebun
they published the story about Meral Maymak and how her family had a great role to join
the PKK.
In his article Terrorist Dot Com, Weimann (2006) describes how an average
American boy became an al Qaeda member. Adam Gadahn lived with his parents in
Riverside County, California. His life was changed at the age of seventeen when he
learned about Islam on the web. His web communications finally led to his joining al
Qaeda. Gadahn attended al Qeada training camps and worked as a translator for the
group.
Sageman (2004) unveils the importance of friendship and kinship in the process
of the mujahidin recruitment process. According to his findings, 81 of the mujahidin
joined the terrorist organizations through their friends and families (bottom up process).
Terrorist organizations prefer the bottom up process instead of the top down process of
recruitment strategy because of security reasons.
In Weinberg and Eubank’s (1987) study, 13 percent of Italian terrorists had a
family member effect their decision (mostly husband and wives) when they joined the
terrorist organization. The remaining number can be seen less in the data because most of
the terrorists were single.
Wells and Horowitz (2007) studied 43 Hamas suicide members and found that
Hamas prefer to choose new recruits among friends and family of existing members. AlQaida also prefers the same structure.
Environmental and cultural factors have an impact on individual decision-making.
Some researchers stated that environment (or culture) is an important issue for terrorist
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propaganda (Berko & Erez, 2007; Della Porta, 2006; Moghadam, 2006; Post, Ruby, &
Shaw, 2002; Shelley, 2008; Wells III & Horowitz, 2007). However, the findings of these
studies showed mixed support for environmental or cultural factors. When comparing
economic and frustration factors with cultural factors, Wells and Horowitz (2007) found
little support. Sageman (2004) discovered that 70 percent of the mujahidin were recruited
in countries where they were not born and grew up. On the other hand, Russell and Miller
(1977) found that the environment was an important factor for terrorists. According to
them, universities are one of the main sources for the terrorist recruitment process. In
conclusion, differential association variables including family, friends, and the
environment had little support in terms of their effects on the participation in terrorism.
Relative Deprivation (RD)
The assumptions of relative deprivation theory are in harmony with the
assumptions of the frustration-aggression hypothesis of Dollard and his colleagues
(1939). Both theories assert that Relative Deprivation happens where individuals or
groups feel unfairly disadvantaged over others perceived as having similar features and,
they feel deserving of similar rewards (their reference groups).
The main differences between relative deprivation theory and frustrationaggression hypothesis is that “thinking others as having something and feeling himself as
entitled to have the same thing are necessary preconditions for deprivation, whereas the
latter asserts that desire for something and thinking it feasible to obtain are sufficient for
frustration” (Berkowitz, 1972).
Samuel Stouffer and his colleagues first used the term of relative deprivation in
the article, The American Soldier (1949). After this writing, relative deprivation has
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received significant attention from political scientists (Nagel, 1974; Gurr, 1968, 1970),
sociologists (Davies, 1959; Merton&Rossi, 1957; and Runciman, 1966), and
psychologists (Adams, 1965; Crosby, 1976; and Pettigrew, 1964, 1967). There are four
famous models of relative deprivation and Gurr’s specific formulation of relative
deprivation tried to explained.
According to Davies (1959), who first studied in order to create a formal theory of
relative deprivation, a person who is certain that goods and opportunities do not exist will
have a sense of injustice while others have those goods and opportunities. Davies’
approach to relative deprivation includes three essential circumstances for deprivation:
the individual who does not have something desired should (a) perceive that others have
it; (b) have a desire for it; and (c) have a feeling of entitlement for it. In the nonexistence
of any one of these factors, deprivation does not happen. In Davies’ view, an individual
can compare it from in-group or out-of-group members.
Runciman (1966) added another requirement to Davies’ ideas and stated that an
individual should also feel that finding the desired goods and opportunities is possible. In
his view, this requirement helps a person to separate unrealistic and realistic hopes. If an
individual knows that his wish is an unrealistic one, he does not feel a deprivation;
otherwise he feels deprivation. Runciman made a separation between egoistic deprivation
(an individual comparing himself to others) and fraternal deprivation (individual
comparing his group to other groups).
Gurr (1970) created a definition of relative deprivation without making an
assumption about the source of expectations. He defined relative deprivation as the
“individual’s perception of discrepancy between his expectations and capabilities.

54

Accordingly, expected status or standards may not only be determined in reference to
others. Rather the so-called or perceived deprivation may also reflect one’s own past
condition, or an abstract ideal, or standards put by leaders” (Yilmaz, 2009).
In Gurr’s view, decremental deprivation is based on what a person had before or
believed he could have. It is based on the person’s past condition and value capabilities
start to decline when his value of expectations stays at the same level.
On the other hand, in aspirational deprivation, a certain loss does not exist. A
person is angered since he has no means to achieve increasing or rising expectations. In
aspirational deprivation, expectations start to increase while capabilities stay the same.
According to Gurr, education is the source of the increases of expectations in traditional
people’s lives. This education results in the increases of expectations, and at the end if the
level of achievement does not also increase parallel to the expectations, the relative
deprivation can occur.
As a special case of aspirational deprivation, progressive deprivation, which is
defined by Gurr as a third category of deprivation, may occur. The term, progressive
deprivation, means that, a rising improvement in both expectations and capabilities
creates an expectation of continued improvement. Progressive deprivation occurs when
the capabilities stabilize or decrease after such an improvement. This is a special case of
aspirational deprivation and it occurs when there is a situation of an economic recession
in a growing economy.
Progressive deprivation is similar to a generalized version of Davies’s (1962) Jcurve. According to Davies, individuals feel angry when they do not have a chance to
establish/obtain certain standards and opportunities if they (a) have a desire for them and
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(b) if they possessed them in the past. The main difference between relative deprivation
theory and Davies’s J-Curve (and also Gurr’s progressive deprivation) is that an
individual can compare himself not only with others but also with his own past.
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Time
Past

Present

Figure-2 Davies J-Curve

Empirical Support of Relative Deprivation Theory
Rather than studying the relationship between relative deprivation and
participation in terrorist activities, terrorism researchers generally focus on the
relationship between poverty, education, socioeconomic class and terrorism. The
President of the USA, George W. Bush (2002) said, “We fight poverty because hope is
the answer to terror... We will challenge the poverty and hopelessness and lack of
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education and failed governments that too often allow conditions that terrorists can
seize”. Berman (2003) points out that the actual terrorists are drawn from a large pool of
volunteers who tend to be from the poorest part of their societies. Stern (2000) also found
out in her study that most of the people who join terrorist groups are from the poorest
classes. Among those groups the ones selected for missions are likely to be the most
committed and also the most capable.
In their study, Holmes, De Pin˜ Eres and Curtin (2007) explained the traditional
political and economic factors that have been purported to explain the prevalence of
insurgency. They used the following hypotheses at the subnational level in Colombia:
guerrilla violence is positively associated with exports; higher levels of insurgency are
associated with low levels of GDP per capita or negative growth rates; guerrilla violence
emerges in the context of weak state presence; and higher levels of state repression are
associated with higher levels of insurgent violence. Holmes, De Pin˜ Eres and Curtin
(2007) assert that there is a direct relation between FARC violence and low
socioeconomic conditions.
Kruger and Maleckova (2003) studied on the relationship between poverty (or
education) and participation in the (Lebanon) Hezbollah by working on 129 Hezbollah
members. When they compared terrorists and non-terrorists they discovered that there
was little relationship between poverty or education and participation in terrorism, and
most of the Hezbollah members were from wealthy families and high education.
Hassan’s (2001) and Berribi’s studies also did not support the poverty link.
None of these studies could construct relative deprivation theory. In order to
measure the relative deprivation, the gap between expectation and achievements needs to
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be identified. Therefore, poverty level or socioeconomic status simply do not help to
measure deprivation. Sageman’s (2004) study supported this idea. He studied 172 Salafi
Mujahedin and found that, the reason of rising terrorism is not poverty. When he
compared occupational skills and actual employment status of terrorists, he found some
signals of relative deprivation. In his opinion, if expectations rise opposed to the actual
achievements, this could possibly end in relative deprivation, which is the factor that leads an
individual to join a terrorist organization.

Frustration Theory
Frustration theory was also used in terrorism studies. According to Dollard et al.
(1939) “the occurrence of aggressive behavior always presupposes the existence of
frustration and, contrariwise, that the existence of frustration always leads to some form
of aggression”. However, the term ‘frustration’ is used to refer not only to the process of
blocking a person’s attainment of reinforcement but also to the reaction to such blocking.
As a result, ‘being frustrated’ means both that one’s access to reinforce is being upset by
another party (or possibly by particular circumstances) and that one’s reaction to this
upsetting is one of annoyance.
If frustration always leads to aggression, how does this process occur? According
to Dollard et al. (1939), the motivational power to aggression is a function of: (a) the
reinforcement value of the frustrated goal response, (b) the degree of frustration of this
goal response (not all frustrations start aggression, but rather frustration starts aggression
only if it is complete), and (c) the number of frustrated response sequences (frustration is
an additive process and it improves cumulatively).
Dollard et al. (1939) accepted that sometimes aggression may be inhibited and it
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may break out in a different form. Inhibition occurs when the probable severity of
punishment exceeds the probable pleasure of aggression. At this point, frustration results
in covert aggression. Dollard et al. (1939) symbolized that inhibited overt aggression
cannot be accepted as nonaggression. In their view, inhibited overt aggression can be
considered as covert aggression. Those who mark the aggression covertly sometimes are
defined as “furious inside”.
The redirection or displacement of aggression is concerned with frustrationaggression theory. Dollard et al. (1939) recommended that frustration leads to aggression
against the primary source of said frustration. But, sometimes aggression is directed
against an alternative target. It happens if there is a relationship between the primary and
alternative source of frustration.
“How long can an instigation to aggression arise?” is another important
question. Instigation to aggression can only be reduced by violent or hostile events either
against the primary or alternative targets. The instigation to aggression rises with every
frustration until it finally results in violence because of its additive process characteristic.
As a result, frustration has long-term effects and is a necessary element in hostility and
aggression (Zillmann, 1979).
Miller (1941) asserts that, “Frustration produces instigations to a number of
different types of response, one of which is instigation to some form of aggression”.
Miller (1941) also explains that frustration activates motivational forces that are diffused
rather than specific to aggression. It is activated by the properties of a general drive.
Berkowitz (1962) agrees with the Dolared et.al.’s idea that “frustration is an
interference with an instigated goal response at its proper time in the behavioral
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sequence”. However, in his view “frustration is neither a simple deprivation nor a state of
mind, but rather it is an interference with the realization of a (specific) goal-driven
activity at a specific time” (Yilmaz, 2009). Berkowitz (1962), tried to answer the question
of “When does frustration actually result in aggression?”. He believed that aggression
occurs when the frustrated individual finds an appropriate object to direct his aggression
towards. This target can be anyone or anything.
Empirical Support of the Frustration Theory
Previous terrorism studies supported the relationship between frustration and
joining terrorism. Consonant with this point of view, this study also found the factors that
are accepted as frustrating in the terrorist group joining process. Berko and Erez (2007)
studied Palestinian women’s motivation and found that 5 out of 14 women suffered from
harms and losses (family loss) caused by Israeli military operations before they joined a
terrorist organization.
In Pedahzur’s (2005) study, Chechen suicide bomber Kaira, a 22 year old student,
was one of the members of the attack on the Moscow theatre. The officials killed her
husband and brother and destroyed her house before she joined the rebels. Pedahzur
(2005) detects that many Chechen women became suicide bombers after losing a loved
one. Around 90 Palestinian suicide bombers committed a suicide act very soon after
losing a person close one to them like a friend, family member or lover. Pedahzur (2005)
states that in 2001, when they started to carry out suicide attacks, the representatives of
the terrorist group were sent to universities, schools and mosques. They were looking for
"young people who had a history of confrontation with the Israelis or who lost family or
friends in incidents with the Israeli army". Those young people that they were looking for
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could easily join their organization. Singer (2006) also agrees with this point of view.
According to Singer (2006), the loss of a relative or friend, jailing or brutal treatment by
local security forces may place young people under the influence of radical groups.
In his illegal book Kendini Kesfeden Ulus (The Nation that Discovers Itself),
Besikci (1993) expresses of the impact of the "guerilla" fight on Kurdish society. Besikci
(1993) argues that “young Kurdish individuals who are killed in the fight by Turkish
security forces are called "martyrs", and mass prayers take place for those martyrs.
People visit the families of those martyrs for days and weeks to pay their respects. You
can see the shadow of martyrdom around every town and these developments have a deep
impact on the awareness of Kurdish society. Young Kurdish individuals become attentive
to the social realities through these developments.”
Florez-Morris (2007) conducted an in-depth interview with 42 Colombian
terrorists. According to her findings, the use of excessive force by the police in
demonstrations was an important factor that encouraged these individuals to be a part of
terrorist organizations. Additionally, some terrorists believe that they become a
government target because of their joining the terrorist organization. In order to
understand the role of frustration in the involvement process, the characteristics of the
suicide bombers need to be analyzed.
Stern (2003) asserts that Israeli policies have increased to the desperation and
unmanageable anger among the Palestinian people. According to Sprinzak (2003), the
turning point for Hamas to opt for suicide bombing was the case of Baruch Goldstein‘s
massacre of 29 Palestinians in Hebron in 1994. To Mogadham (2003), many suicide
bombers in Palestine seek to get a high rate of casualty and injury. Moghadam (2003)

61

also asserts that both sides (the Israeli and Palestine sides) have experienced injured or
lost loved ones.
Moreover, Weinberg et Al. (2003) found clear evidence that suicide bombers had
negative experiences with Israeli authorities and therefore they prefer to use brutal
tactics. Yom and Saleh (2004) who studied about 87 Palestinian suicide bombers stated
that many of the bombers were either imprisoned, injured, or lost their family members
by Israeli authorities. Soibelman (2004) interviewed five Palestinian suicide bombers
who failed the attack and found the same results.
Well and Horowitz (2007) classified 10 different motivational factors (latent
variables) in their study. These factors were psychological disorder, small group
dynamics, operational usefulness, religious factors, frustration against Israeli oppression,
economic factors, cultural factors, revenge, and social network factors. As a result,
frustration was found to be the second most important factor with the help of structural
equation modeling as a statistical technique. According to previous terrorism studies,
frustration, revenge, police use of excessive force, government repression, vengeance,
and negative experiences with military forces were correlated with either participation in
terrorism in general or the participation in a suicide attack.
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CHAPTER III: METHODOLOGY

Introduction

There are two main criticisms of terrorism studies. The first is the definition
problem of terrorism. The second is too policy prescriptive or too state-centric (evaluate
terrorism as a tactic tremendously inflicted by delegitimized sub-state actors, whereas
state violence represents some other, more legitimate, type of activity) characteristics of
terrorism studies (Cameron & Munroe, 2008). Silke (2004) argues that terrorism studies
are limited by “[t]he dominance of orthodox international relations (IR) approaches and a
lack of interdisciplinarity; the tendency to treat contemporary terrorism as a “new”
phenomenon that started on September 11 th, 2001 and a persistent lack of historicity.”
Most terrorism studies tried to identify a common terrorist type in order to
understand the differences between terrorist and non-terrorist groups. The main purpose
of this study is to identify the motivational differences between active participant and
supporters in the PKK terrorist organization. This study tries to analyze the idea that there
are different degrees of involvement levels in terrorist organizations and the terrorist
group members are prompted by different socio demographic and motivational factors.
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This study is exploratory in nature because it tries to identify the motives that may
have an effect on terrorists’ involvement differences. As seen in the literature review
section, a study with this specific focus has not been conducted yet. Biographies of
terrorists will be used as the data source in this study. Further details regarding how
biographies were collected will be provided in the data collection section. Finally, this
study was distinctive in the sense that it used inferential statistics in an effort to extend its
findings beyond the simple description of a typical terrorist.
Methods
Research Question
What are the demographic and motivational differences between active
participants and supporters in the PKK terrorist organization?
The Hypotheses
H1. Active participants are more likely to have a lower education level than supporters.
H2.Active participants are more likely to be unemployed than supporters.
H3. The probability of being an active participant is higher for those who have lost a
loved one in a counter-terrorism operation than for those who have not.
H4. The probability of being an active participant is higher for those who have dropped
out of school than for those who have not.
H5. The probability of being an active participant is higher for those who have
experienced a family arrest than for those who have not.
H6. The probability of being an active participant is higher for those who have a family
member (father, mother, brother, and sister) associated with a terrorist group than for
those who do not.
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H7. The probability of being an active participant is higher for those who have been first
recruited by a family member, relative, or friend than for those who have been recruited
by other means (by reading publications or from prison).
H8. Relative deprivation has a significant effect on the probability of involvement in
terrorist activities controlling for social class, age, gender, and marital status.
H9. Frustration has a significant effect on the probability of involvement in terrorist
activities controlling for age, gender, and marital status.
H10. Differential Association has a significant effect on the probability of involvement in
terrorist activities controlling for age, gender, and marital status.
Variables
The dependent variable is being a member of the PKK (Partiya Karkaren
Kurdistan - Kurdistan Workers' Party). Being a member of a terrorist organization (PKK)
is defined as The Turkish Law of Terror Prevention (1991). According to that approach,
the dependent variable will be measured as supporter, active participant (-0 supporter, -1
active participant). This variable will be collected from official records. In order to find
the terrorist’s involvement level, the researcher will;
- Check the judicial records because active participants and supporters are judged
by a different section of the Turkish Penal Code,
- Check the security forces records. Some of the terrorists were killed by the
combat terrorism operations,
- Check the TNP intelligence reports and background records.
The variable will be measured as a dichotomous variable (―0 supporter ―1
Active participant).
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Independent Variables
In general, independent variables can be categorized into three groups: demographics,
family backgrounds, and recruitment. Demographic variables in this study include age (age),
gender (gender), education (education), school dropout (dropout), marital status
(maritalstatus) and work status (workstatus). Variables indicating family backgrounds
include family arrest (Familyarrest), family association (familyassociation), and loss of
somebody (loss). There is one variable in the last category: method of recruitment
(recruitment)

Age
Instead of giving their exact age when they were filling the biographies, PKK
members put their date of birth. PKK members’ age was calculated by subtracting the
date of birth from the date of report. Therefore, age was measured in ratio level.
Gender
PKK members gave information about their gender in their biographies. Gender
was measured as a nominal (dichotomous) variable (―0 indicating female and ―1
indicating male).
Education
Education level was measured based on educational level at the time (date) of
report. According to the highest degree obtained, there were primary school graduates,
middle school graduates, high school graduates, and university graduates. Those who
dropped out were also measured as primary school dropout, middle school dropout, high
school dropout, and university dropout. Other than graduates and dropouts, there were
also students at the time when they wrote their biographies. To reduce the number of
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categories, “dropout categories” was collapsed and cases in these categories were added
in the educational category, specifying where the person attended last before the dropout.
A treatment of this type, however, can cause a significant information loss. In a recent
study of Turkish terrorists, Sevinc (2008) and Yilmaz (2009) included the dropouts in the
educational categories, specifying where the person attended last. From this perspective,
education was measured on a 5-point ordinal scale (―1 indicating primary school, ―2
indicating middle school, ―3 indicating high school, ―4 indicating university and –
university graduate). Thus, the primary school category was included primary school
graduates and dropouts. The middle school category included middle school graduates and
dropouts. The high school category included high school graduates, dropouts, and current
students. The university category included university students, dropouts, and current

students. Since categories were rank-ordered, the higher the education level, the better, or
vice versa.
Work status
Work status refers to the employment status of respondents. Work status was
defined using a 3-point nominal scale (―1 indicating unemployed, ―2 indicating
working-part-time, and ―3 indicating working full-time). With respect to the
measurement level, some researchers used work (or employment status) as a nominal
variable (Ferguson, 2000); however, some used it as an ordinal variable (Dickerson, et
al., 2004; Liao, 1994). There is ranking among the categories; obviously the differences
between the categories cannot be accepted as the same. Therefore, in this study, work
status was treated as a nominal variable.
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Marital status
Marital status of PKK members was also in all biographies. Marital status was
measured on a 3-point nominal scale: -1 never married, 2- married, and 3divorced/separated.
Dropout
As stated before, dropout, as a separate variable, was not available in the original
datasets. Rather, dropout was defined as an educational category. Considering that school
dropout can be a motivation for some terrorists, dropout categories at various educational
levels was collapsed into a dummy variable to distinguish school dropouts from nondropouts. In other words, if the person reported that he or she dropped out of school (at
any educational level), that person was categorized under ―dropout or otherwise ―nondropout. The measurement level was dichotomous (―0 indicating non-dropouts, ―1
indicating dropouts).
Drop out reason can be different. Some terrorists may have simply failed or had to
leave school for economic or other reasons. Another reason is that some terrorists may
have been expelled or suspended from school due to the criminal or disciplinary
sanctions imposed on them for participating in illegal activities. In such cases, school
dropout can be a motivation for greater participation in terrorist activities.
Family Background Variables
The family backgrounds of terrorists’ data include familyarrest, loss, and
familyassociation. Familyarrest was measured as to whether the person had a family
arrest. Loss was measured as to whether the person lost a loved in a counter-terrorism
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operation. Familyassociation was measured as to whether the person had family members
associated with a terrorist group. These three variables were dichotomous (―0 indicating
no and ―1 indicating yes) measures.
Recruitment
Terrorists mentioned the person by whom they were recruited first in the
biographies. Response categories included: friends, relatives (including family members),
organizational publication, in prisons, in demonstrations, and other. Since there was small
number of cases that were recruited by reading about the organization in the publications,
in prison and in demonstration categories, these were collapsed and cases were merged
with the ―other category. Thus, recruitment was comprised of a 3-point nominal scale
(―1 indicating friends, ―2 indicating relatives, ―3 indicating other).
Relative Deprivation
This study measured relative deprivation as the combined effect of education and
workstatus controlling for gender, age, and maritalstatus. As aforementioned, this model
was adapted from Gurr‘s (1970) ―aspirational deprivation.
Frustration-Aggression Variables
This study measured the frustration as the combined effect of loss, familyarrest,
and dropout. All three variables were dichotomous measures. Hence, there was no way to
determine the certainty of aggression as measured by the level and number of frustrating
interferences (Dollard, et al., 1939). On the other hand, Miller et al. (1941) suggested that
“―simply occurrence or existence of a frustrating event is a sufficient, if not a necessary,
condition for aggression”. Therefore, the dichotomous-level measurement satisfies the
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requirement for what Miller et al. (1941) calls the ―occurrence or existence of a
frustrating event.
Differential Association
This study was drawn upon Sutherland‘s (1975) differential association theory
because it clearly identified the social processes by which people learn from each other.
This theory was directly tested but it was used as a framework. In this study, differential
association was measured by the combined effect of familyassociation and recruitment
(method of recruitment).
Validation of Measurement
In order to see the latent dimensions of the variables used to define theoretical
concepts (relative deprivation, frustration-aggression, and social learning), factor analysis
was performed. This statistical technique is mostly used for reducing large number of
variables into a small number of factors. On the other hand, it is also used to validate a
concept by showing that its constituent variables load on the same factor. Variables used
to define each theoretical concept were constructed based on the literature review. Here,
factor analysis was conducted to enhance the validity of concepts.
Variables were also checked for the absence of multicollinearity. There were two
methods available to test multicollinearity. The first method was to check bivariate
correlation coefficients between the variables. The second method was to run a
collinearity diagnostic, which was available in SPSS linear regression analysis. The first
method was employed in this study.
Finally, the data was checked for (multivariate) outliers. To detect the
multivariate outlier, one may regress the dependent variable on all independent variables
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with a request for Mahalanobis distance, which was available in SPSS linear regression
analysis. A Mahalanobis distance of 15.0 and above can be considered a multivariate
outlier.
Research Design
This study used a cross-sectional research design. The cross-sectional research
design is the one that is most applied in the social sciences. It allows the identification of
collected data measured at a single point in time on all proper variables. It also allows the
researcher to identify relationships and correlation amongst numerous variables and it is
also appropriate for studies on large groups of subjects (Nachimas & Nachimas, 2008).
These strengths made a cross sectional design suitable for this study. This study used
quantitative data collection and analysis methods.
Sampling
This study aims to identify the differences between active participants and
supporters of PKK terrorists in terms of demographic and motivational factors. Hence,
the population included the entire membership of PKK terrorists. However, terrorism
studies rarely allow an overarching research that would identify the determinants of
terrorist decision making at an individual and organizational level.
From the methodological standpoint, convenient sampling is a non-probability
sampling technique. In convenience sampling, not all units in a population have the equal
opportunity of being selected (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2000). In this study,
sampling was biased toward the terrorists who had previously given a biography and
those whose biographies were seized by the police. On the other hand, given the nature of
terrorism studies in which researchers mostly lack the opportunity to create a sampling
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frame that is representing the whole population, non-probability sampling is a norm.
Hence, terrorism is one of the applied social research fields where probability sampling is
not feasible.
Although samples cannot be considered as representative of the population of
interest, the generalizability of the findings was not the primary goal of the current study.
On the other hand, terrorists are mostly reluctant to reveal their motives even though
researchers have an access. Therefore, it is difficult to collect data that would enhance
both the representativeness and the quantity of data collected. In order to overcome these
issues, this study collected data from the biographies of terrorists, which were written by
terrorists themselves. As noted earlier, the purpose of the current study was to explore the
patterns of involvement in terrorist activities using an accessible population. Still, the
findings of this study can be generalized to PKK terrorists.
Secondary data analysis of terrorist biographies was used to find out the different
motivations of two different membership statuses (supporters, active participator) and
whether they had different motivations, as terrorism literature suggests different
motivational factors for each group. In this sense, the dependent variable was the type of
organizational membership (supporter, active participator). A sampling frame was
created from a total number of 648 terrorist biographies (183 females, 465 males) that are
saved in the Turkish police archives.
Biographies are considered documentary evidence of membership to terrorist
organizations. Given their high importance, terrorist organizations archive them under
high security. Therefore, counter-terrorism units do not have a high number of terrorist
biographies. Since evidence is kept in separate files, there is no way to determine the total
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number biographies under police security. Therefore 648 biographies were perused with
the permission of authorities. Non-random selection was a threat to repetitiveness since
neither of these 648 (frame) biographies, nor the identified membership status of people
in numbers (sample) may reflect the entire PKK population. However, the size of the
sampling frame was quite high given the difficulties of data collection in terrorism
studies.
The names of the terrorists were checked in the Turkish National Police records,
judicial authorities records operation records and intelligence reports to identify their
membership status. As a result, 447 terrorists could be identified via their membership
status. Among those terrorists, 63 were females (25 supporters, 38 active participants)
and 384 were males (114 supporters, 270 active participants).
Data Collection
The required data was obtained from biographies of terrorists. Biographies were
written by terrorists as an application for membership. A typical biography includes
information about demographics and motivations of the applicant. Therefore, biographies
are rich in terms of the motivations of terrorists, that is, as to why they are willing to join
the terrorist group. Anonymity was provided in this study.
Data Analysis
Research hypotheses were analyzed through both bivariate and multivariate
analysis techniques. Bivariate analysis is the analysis of two variables at the same time.
Bivariate testing of research hypotheses was needed because this study was an
exploratory one. Hence, the relationship between the DV and the IV should be examined
on a one-to-one basis before it is tested in a multivariate setting. Multivariate analysis, on
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the other hand, examines more than two variables simultaneously. In general,
multivariate analysis is used to refine the findings of bivariate analysis. In particular,
because involvement in terrorist activities (DV) is multidimensional, testing the
combined effects of variables is essential.
Bivariate Hypothesis Testing
A number of statistics was available to measure the strength and significance of
(bivariate) association between DV and IVs. As stated in the measurement section: the
dependent variable (membership status) was a dichotomous measure and independent
variables included dichotomous (dropout, loss, familyarrest, and familyassociation),
ordinal (socialclass, and education) and nominal (workstatus and recruitment) variables.
Hypotheses 1 though 7 were tested by constructing contingency tables using the SPSS
crosstab function.

Multivariate Hypothesis Testing
Hypotheses 8 through 10 were tested using binary logistic regression. Binary
logistic regression is an appropriate multivariate analysis technique to predict a
dichotomous DV from a set of nominal, ordinal, and interval/ratio IVs; to determine the
amount of variance in the DV that is explained by the combined IVs; and to calculate the
effect size made by each IV. When testing hypotheses 8 through 10, the hierarchical
logistic regression method was used.
Reliability
Reliability means that the results are reliable time after time, and that this can be
explained by variables. The required data was obtained from the biographies of the

74

terrorists, which were seized in the course of police operations in Turkey. Biographies
were not originally collected for this study. They were written for membership
application. The reliability of information was questionable; however, there were two
features that enhance the reliability of information given. First, biographies were written
by individual terrorists for membership with no other motivations. Terrorists write their
biographies with free will. Second, terrorists are aware of the fact that they have to
provide accurate information in their biographies because the leadership can crosscheck
the accuracy of information.
Validity
External validity refers to whether this study is applicable to other groups. This
study has external validity to some certain extent. The findings of the study can be
applied to the PKK terrorist organization but it cannot be applied to the other terrorist
organizations as each organization has different dynamics and characteristics. Lack of
randomization was also a threat to the validity of the data collected. However, to ensure
randomization is difficult in terrorism studies. However, biographies have been
extensively used by previous studies. The information given in biographies was provided
on snapshot basis. Therefore, it was not possible to construct a causal relationship
between the individuals joining the organization and their motivations. However, in their
biographies, terrorists talked about their motivations before they joined a terrorist
organization. Hence, dependent and independent variables occurred at different points in
time, which enhanced the validity. Empirical validity means that the relationship and the
implementation among the variables measured should be the same in the actual world. To
enhance empirical validity, in this study a wide range of related variables was selected to
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increase the validity and compare the results. As the researcher examined the literature
and looked at many dimensions of the study, it was understood that this study has content
validity. This was true because the measurement instruments covered all the attributes of
the concept that the study was trying to measure as supported from the previous
researches. (Nachmias, & Nachmias, 2000). To ensure validity this study relied on
different theories as an explanation and justification of methods used.
Limitations
Random sampling is impossible to achieve in terror studies. This aspect is also a
limitation of this study. However, terrorist organizations have different characteristics
across different countries. As mentioned in the literature review, most of the studies
focused nearly on the same variables. Terrorism studies have some limitations in their
nature.
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CHAPTER IV: FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS

Factor Analysis

In order to validate theoretical concepts used to explain the relationship between
dependent and independent variables, a factor analysis was performed. As
aforementioned, theoretical frameworks were defined based on previous studies. Before
running the analysis, the assumptions required for factor analysis have been tested.
Education was treated as an interval/ratio measure since the distance between educational
categories was the same. Furthermore, one of the categories of workstatus and
recruitment was collapsed to convert them into a dichotomous variable. That is, the work
part-time and working full-time categories were merged under the new category of
working. A similar treatment was made with respect to recruitment merging the relatives
and friends categories under the category of close associates. Another problem was the
high correlation between family association and family arrest. For treatment, family
arrest was not included in the analysis, because family arrest was a function of family
association.

77

Table 1 Factor Analysis of Variables
Component Matrix

.

a

Component
1

2

3

Recruitment Method

.346

.792

-.205

Family Association

.373

.678

-.171

Education Status

-.496

.427

.679

School Drop out

.686

-.120

.443

Loss of a friend or family

.745

.067

.256

-.248

.118

-.552

member in a terrorist related
incident
Working Status

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
a. 3 components extracted.

As seen in the table, variables are loaded on three factors indicating that there
were three dimensions in terrorist motivations. The variables loaded on the same factor
indicated that they were separate indicators of the same phenomenon. More specifically,
loss and dropout loaded on factor 1; education and work status loaded on factor 2; and
family association and recruitment loaded on factor 3, which all proved to be valid
measures of relative deprivation, frustration, and social learning concepts.
H1. Active participants are younger than supporters.
Table 2. T-Test
Group Statistics

Age

Membership of
Terror
Organization
supporter
active
partcipant

N
139

Mean
29.71

Std. Deviation
5.676

Std. Error Mean
0.481

308

23.55

3.07

0.175
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Independent Samples Test
Levene's Test
for Equality of
Variances

t-test for Equality of Means
95% Confidence

Sig.

Age

Equal
variances

F

Sig.

t

df

87.543

.000

14.85

Interval of the

(2-

Mean

tailed

Differenc

Std. Error

)

e

Difference

Difference
Lower

Upper

445

.000

6.167

.415

5.351

6.982

12.03

175.47

.000

6.167

.512

5.156

7.178

8

7

9

assumed
Equal
variances
not
assumed

The average age for supporters is 30, whereas average age of active participants is
23. The mean difference of 7 years is statistically significant ((F=87.543, p=.000;
t=14.859, p=.000). We can safely reject the null hypothesis. Active participants live in
mountainous areas with difficult life conditions. People can survive at a young age in
these difficult life conditions. Young people do not have enough life experience;
therefore, they are easy to deceive and they can easily be used by the terrorist
organizations. Hence, active participants are expected to be younger than supporters.
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H2. Active participants are more likely to be unemployed than supporters.
Table 3. Working Status * Membership of Terror Organization
Crosstabulation

Working Status

Unemployed

Working Part
Time
Working Full
Time
Total

Chi-Square Values

χ2=223.510

a

Membership of Terror
Organization
active
supporter
partcipant
14
222

Count

Total
236

% within
Working Status
Count

5.90%

94.10%

100.00%

19

61

80

% within
Working Status
Count

23.80%

76.30%

100.00%

106

25

131

% within
Working Status
Count

80.90%

19.10%

100.00%

139

308

447

% within
Working Status

31.10%

68.90%

100.00%

df=2

R2=.ooo

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 24.88.

Crosstabulation work status shows that of the terrorists who are unemployed,
5.9% are supporters and 94.1% are active participants; of the terrorists who are working
part time, 23.8% are supporters and 76.3% are active participants; of the terrorists who
are working full-time, 80.9% are supporters and 19.1% are active participants. The chisquare test of independence shows that these differences are statistically significant
(Pearson Chi square= 223.510, and 0.000<0.1).
The average probability of being an active participant is 68.9% without the effect
of work status. The probability of active participation increases by 25.2% if the terrorist
is unemployed. The average probability of being a supporter is 31.1%.; however, the
probability of being a supporter is 5.9% if the terrorist is unemployed. Those who have
no job are more likely to be active participants by 94.1%. On the other hand, the
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probability of being a supporter is 80.9% for those who have a full-time job. This means
that terrorists who have no job are more likely to be active participants. These
differences are statistically significant (Pearson Chi square= 223.510, and 0.000<0.1).

Figure 3- Work Status Chart
In the chart it is evident that the majority of active participants (222 people) are
unemployed. On the other hand, supporters generally have full-time work (106 people).
We can reject safely the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between working
status and membership status. Supporters and their family members are more likely to
have a well paid job and live in big cities. 80% of supporters have a full-time job. They
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live their normal life; they have a family, job and income. On the other hand, active
participants are not the same. 94% of active participants are unemployed. Being an active
participant is a full-time activity and these individuals live in the mountainous area of the
southeastern part of Turkey. These results can be explained bia Toby’s (1957) ideas. In
his view, deviant behavior can occur in conformity.
H3. The probability of being an active participant is higher for those who have
lost a loved one in a counter-terrorism operation than for those who have not.
Table 4- Loss of a friend or family member in a terrorist related incident * Membership of Terror
Organization Crosstabulation

Loss of a friend
or family
member in a
terrorist related
incident

Total

No

Count

53.70%

Yes

% within Loss
of a friend or
family member
in a terrorist
related incident
Count

24

209

233

% within Loss
of a friend or
family member
in a terrorist
related incident
Count

10.30%

89.70%

100.00%

139

308

447

% within Loss
of a friend or
family member
in a terrorist
related incident

31.10%

68.90%

100.00%

Total

Chi-Square Values

Membership of Terror
Organization
active
supporter
partcipant
115
99

χ2=98.231

a

df=1

46.30%

R2=.ooo

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 66.55.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

214
100.00%
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Crosstabulation of loss of a friend or family member in a terrorist related incident
shows that of the terrorists who lost friend or family member in a terrorist related
incident, 10.3% are supporters and 89.7% are active participants. The chi-square test of
independence shows that these differences are statistically significant (Pearson Chi
square= 98.231, and 0.000<0.1).
The average probability of being an active participant is 68.9% without the effect
of the loss of a friend or family member. The probability of active participation increases
by 20.8% if the terrorist has lost a friend or family member. The average probability of
being a supporter 31.1%.; however, the probability of being a supporter is 10.3% if the
terrorist has a loss in the family. Those who have a loss in the family are more likely to
by active participants by the rate of 89.7%. On the other hand, the probability of being a
supporter is 53.7% for those who have experienced no loss in the family or of a friend.
This means that terrorists who have lost a loved one are more likely to be active
participants. These differences are statistically significant (Pearson Chi square= 96.214,
and

0.000<0.1).

relationship.

Hence, we can safely reject the null hypothesis that there is no
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Figure 4- Chart of loss of family member and friend
The analysis shows that 89.7% (209 people) were active participants because they
had lost their loved ones in counter terrorism operations; on the other hand, 10.3% (24
people) of the sample became supporters after losing their loved ones. These results
remind one of the feeling of frustration and desire for revenge felt by PKK members. The
lost loved ones become heroes in their eyes, and each year a ceremony is conducted at
their place of rest to honor their sacrifice and to encourage the recruitment of new
members.
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H4. The probability of being an active participant is higher for those who have
dropped out of school than for those who have not.

Table 5- School Drop out * Membership of Terror Organization Crosstabulation

School Drop
out

a

Total

No

Count

45.80%

54.20%

100.00%

Yes

% within School
Drop out
Count

15

161

176

% within School
Drop out
Count

8.50%

91.50%

100.00%

139

308

447

% within School
Drop out

31.10%

68.90%

100.00%

Total

χ2=69.039

Membership of Terror
Organization
active
supporter
partcipant
124
147

df=1

R2=.000

271

N= 447

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 54.73.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Crosstabulation of school drop out shows that of the terrorists who dropped out
school, 8.5% are supporters and 91.5% are active participants. The chi-square test of
independence shows that these differences are statistically significant (Pearson Chi
square= 69.039, and 0.000<0.1).
The average probability of being an active participant is 68.9% without the effect
of school drop out. The probability of being an active participant increases by 22.6% if
the terrorist drops out the school. The average probability of being a supporter is 31.1%;
however, the probability of being a supporter is 8.5% if the terrorist drops out the school.
Those who drop out of school are more likely to be active participants by 91.5%. This
means that terrorists who have no loss are more likely to be supporters.

These
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differences are statistically significant (Pearson Chi square= 69.039, and 0.000<0.1).
Hence, we can safely reject the null hypothesis that there is no relationship.

Figure 5 – Chart of School Drop Out
However, there is no evidence in the literature that the differences can be
explained by the feelings of frustration. In order to understand whether a drop out is a
frustration factor; the reason for the drop out can be understood. Some terrorists may
have economic problems and therefore, they can drop out school; or they can fail the
school so they have to drop out. These can be reasons but drop out rate is still high; 161
people have dropped out and become active participants and 15 people become
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supporters. Therefore, there must be some other reason for explaining the high drop out
rate. There can be two reasons for these explanations: the terrorists retiring to the
mountains and some criminal and disciplinary activities taking place. As per this point of
view, the drop out is not the individual’s own choice; therefore it can be accepted as a
frustration factor.
H5. The probability of being an active participant is higher for those who have
experienced a family arrest than for those who have not.

Table 6- Family Arrest * Membership of Terror Organization Crosstabulation

Family Arrest

a

Total

No

Count

43.40%

56.60%

100.00%

Yes

% within Family
Arrest
Count

33

170

203

% within Family
Arrest
Count

16.30%

83.70%

100.00%

139

308

447

% within Family
Arrest

31.10%

68.90%

100.00%

Total

χ2=38.224

Membership of Terror
Organization
active
supporter
partcipant
106
138

df=1

R2=.ooo

244

N= 447

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 54.73.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Crosstabulation of family arrest shows that of the terrorists who have had a family
arrest experience, 16.3% are supporters and 83.7% are active participants. The chi-square
test of independence shows that these differences are statistically significant (Pearson Chi
square= 38.224, and 0.000<0.1).
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The average probability of being an active participant is 68.9% without the effect
of family arrest experience. The probability of being an active participant increases by
14.8% if the terrorist has a family arrest experience. The average probability of being a
supporter is 31.1%; however, the probability of being a supporter is 16.3% if the terrorist
has a family arrest experience. Those who have a family arrest experience are more likely
to be active participants by 83.7%. This means that terrorists who have a family arrest
experience are more likely to be active participants. These differences are statistically
significant (Pearson Chi square= 38.224, and 0.000<0.1). Hence, we can safely reject
the null hypothesis that there is no relationship.

Figure 6- Chart of Family Arrest
According to previous studies, family arrest is a potential variable for frustration
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(Berko & Erez, 2007; Weinberg, et al, 2003; Yom & Saleh, 2004). The findings of this
study supported the previous studies. Counter terrorism operations motivate the family
members against the authority. Terrorist organization members use the emotional
conditions of an arrested person’s family in order to get new recruitments. They provide
them a lawyer and they financially support the family so they feel gratitude toward the
terrorist organizations. Additionally, the family members enjoy great respect from
terrorist organization members. They try to win the hearts and minds of the families.
H6. The probability of being an active participant is higher for those who have a
family member (father, mother, brother, and sister) associated with a terrorist group than
for those who do not.
Table 7- Family Association * Membership of Terror Organization Crosstabulation

Family
Association

a

Total

No

Count

50.80%

Yes

% within Family
Association
Count

42

214

256

% within Family
Association
Count

16.40%

83.60%

100.00%

139

308

447

% within Family
Association

31.10%

68.90%

100.00%

Total

χ2=60.340

Membership of Terror
Organization
active
supporter
partcipant
97
94

df=1

R2=.ooo

49.20%

N= 447

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 54.73.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Crosstabulation of family association shows that of the terrorists who have a
family association, 16.4% are supporters and 83.6% are active participants. The chi-

191
100.00%
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square test of independence shows that these differences are statistically significant
(Pearson Chi square= 60.340, and 0.000<0.1).
The average probability of being an active participant is 68.1% without the effect
of family association. The probability of being an active participant increases by 14.7% if
the terrorist has a family association. The average probability of being a supporter 31.1%;
however, the probability of being a supporter is 16.4% if the terrorist has a family
association. Those who have family association are more likely to be active participants
by 83.6%. On the other hand, the probability of being a supporter is 50.8% for those who
have no family association. This means that terrorists who have a family association are
more likely to be active participants.

These differences are statistically significant

(Pearson Chi square= 60.340, and 0.000<0.1). Hence we can safely reject the null
hypothesis that there is no relationship.

These results can be easily explained by

Differential Association Theory. If a person who has grown in a family environment
where the ideology of the terrorist organization is favored, he is more likely to have a
greater involvement in terrorism than one who grew up in a law-abiding family
environment. This study shows that family ties have a great impact on a terrorist’s life.
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H7. The probability of being an active participant probability is higher for those
who have been first recruited by a family member, relative, or friend than for those who
have been recruited by other means (by reading publications or in prison).
Table 8- Recruitment Method * Membership of Terror Organization Crosstabulation

Recruitment
Method

friend

Count

Membership of Terror
Organization
active
supporter
partcipant
77
115

% within
Recruitment
Method
familymembers

Count
% within
Recruitment
Method

publication

Count
% within
Recruitment
Method

Total

Count
% within
Recruitment
Method

χ2=112.518

a

df=2

R2=.ooo

Total
192

40.10%

59.90%

100.00%

27

191

218

12.40%

87.60%

100.00%

35

2

37

94.60%

5.40%

100.00%

139

308

447

31.10%

68.90%

100.00%

N= 447

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 11.51.

Crosstabulation of membership by how they first meet with the organization
shows that of the terrorists who are first introduced to the organization through a friend,
40.1% are supporters and 59.9% are active participants; of the terrorists who are
introduced by family members, 12.4% are supporters and 87.6% are active participants;
of the terrorists who learn of the organization by reading about it in publications, 94.6%
are supporters and 5.4% are active participants. The chi-square test of independence
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shows that these differences are statistically significant (Pearson Chi square= 112.518
and 0.000<0.1).
The average probability of being an active participant is 68.9% without the effect
of being introduced to the organization. The probability of active participation decreases
by 9% if the terrorists are introduced to the organization by a friend and increases to
18.7% if the terrorist is introduced to the organization by a family member. Furthermore,
this probability decreases by 63.5% if the terrorist is exposed to the organization by
reading about it in publications. The average probability of being a supporter is 31.1%;
however, the probability of being a supporter is 40.1% if the terrorist is introduced to the
organization by a friend. Those who are introduced to the organization by family
members are more likely to be active participants by 87.6%. On the other hand, the
probability of being a supporter is 40.1% for those who are introduced to the organization
by friends and 94.6% for those who are introduced to the organization by reading about it
publications. This means that terrorists who are introduced to the organization by friends
or publications are more likely to be supporters.

These differences are statistically

significant (Pearson Chi square= 112.518 and 0.000<0.1). Hence, we can safely reject the
null hypothesis.
Supporters are more likely to have a well paid job and live in big cities and they
are introduced to and learn about the organization from their friends. These have more of
a chance to access and read the publications. On the contrary, active participants are more
likely to be live with their family at their hometowns; , they are more likely to learn of
the organization through their family members.
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Hypotheses 8-10 were tested through logistic regression analysis. More
specifically, a hierarchical logistic regression analysis was applied to each model to
single out the precise impact of relative deprivation, frustration, and social learning
variables from a set of demographic or control variables. Before running hierarchical
logistic regression for each model, a baseline model was constructed to test the
assumptions of logistic regression analysis.
Logistic regression requires that variables in the analysis be measured in either
dichotomous or on an interval/ratio level. In order to meet this criterion, workstatus and
recruitment, originally measured nominally, were recoded into a set of dummy variables
through the SPSS binary logistic function. For workstatus, parameter estimates were
made for those working full-time (fulltime) and part-time (part-time), while those in the
unemployed category (unemployed) were kept as reference. For recruitment, parameter
estimates were made for those who were recruited by friends (friends) and relatives
(relatives), while those recruited by publication (publication) were excluded for
comparison.
Logistic regression analysis is based upon maximum likelihood estimation, which
in turn relies on asymptotic normality. In case of an inadequate number of samples falling
under each category of an independent variable, the reliability may fall under risk. As a
rule of thumb, 10 cases for each category of independent variable are considered
adequate. Accordingly, the descriptive analyses indicated no such risk for any of the
independent variable, except for those active participants who were recruited through
publication.
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Logistic regression analysis is sensitive to the multicollinearity issue. In case of
an excessive correlation, which is .70 or more as a rule of thumb, between two
independent variables, multicollinearity is likely. In such cases, one of the independent
variables that causes multicollinearity should be dropped. Baseline models indicated that
any of the logistic regression analyses suffered from a multicollinearity issue.
H8. Relative deprivation has a significant effect on the probability of involvement
in terrorist activities controlling for social class, age, gender, and marital status.

Table 9- Relative Deprivation Table
Variables in the Equation
Step1

Age

B
-.238

S.E.
.041

Wald
33.742

Sex

.027

.373

.005

Maritalstatus

Step 2

df
1

Sig.
.000

Exp(B)
.788

1

.942

1.028

-1.051

.275

14.647

1

.000

.350

Constant

8.567

1.007

72.368

1

.000

5256.184

Age

-.130

.047

7.717

1

.005

.878

Sex

.512

.440

1.356

1

.244

1.669

-.698

.323

4.659

1

.031

.498

Education

-.524

.154

11.581

1

.001

.592

Workstatus

-1.637

.196

69.562

1

.000

.195

9.677

1.202

64.769

1

.000

15939.630

Maritalstatus

Constant
Step1: χ2=112.518 ,
Step2: χ2=102.448,

df=2, Nigelkerke R2=0.463, 0.000<0.1, N=447, Percentage correct=83.7
df=2, Nigelkerke R2=0.656, 0.000<0.1, N=447, Percentage correct=88.1

In order to test whether active participation is a function of relative deprivation, a
logistic regression model was produced. While education and work status were included
as two indicators of relative deprivation, age, sex, and marital status were treated as
control variables. The Nagelkerke R2 value of .656 indicated that the model has a high
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discriminatory power. Furthermore, the model predicted the participation level with 88%
accuracy. The discriminatory power of education and work status, on the other hand, was
statistically significant controlling for age, sex, and marital status. Negative signs of
education and work status indicated that these two variables had a negative relationship
with participation. In other words, as work status and education status improved, the
likelihood of actively participating in terrorist activities decreased.
H9. Frustration has a significant effect on the probability of involvement
in terrorist activities controlling for age, gender, and marital status
Table 10- Frustration Table
Variables in the Equation
Step 1

Age

B
-.238

S.E.
.041

Wald
33.742

Sex

.027

.373

.005

Maritalstatus

Step 2

df
1

Sig.
.000

Exp(B)
.788

1

.942

1.028

-1.051

.275

14.647

1

.000

.350

Constant

8.567

1.007

72.368

1

.000

5256.184

Age

-.195

.048

16.378

1

.000

.823

Sex

.637

.461

1.910

1

.167

1.891

Maritalstatus

-1.194

.318

14.098

1

.000

.303

Loss

1.624

.351

21.414

1

.000

5.075

Dropout

1.700

.399

18.205

1

.000

5.476

Familyarrest
Constant

.750

.328

5.224

1

.022

2.118

5.786

1.132

26.137

1

.000

325.621

Step1: χ2=178.295 , df=3, Nigelkerke R2=0.463, 0.000<0.1, N=447, Percentage correct=83.7
Step2: χ2=84.330, df=3, Nigelkerke R2=0.625, 0.000<0.1, N=447, Percentage correct=86.8

Another logistic regression model was produced to test whether frustration
variables have a discriminatory power on participating in terrorist activities. In this
model, loss, dropout, and familyarrest were all taken as frustration indicators while age,
sex, and marital status were taken as control variables. Just like the previous model, this
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model also had a high discriminatory power as indicated by the Nagelkerke R2 value of
.625. The accuracy of prediction was also high with 86% of the participation level being
accurately predicted. All three frustration variables significantly discriminated between
active and passive participants controlling for age, sex, and marital status. In other words,
the existence of any of the frustration variable increased the likelihood of participation in
terrorist activities even at the same age, gender and marriage categories.
H10. Differential Association has a significant effect on the probability of
involvement in terrorist activities controlling for age, gender, and marital status.
Table 11- Differential Association Table
Variables in the Equation
Step 1

Age

B
-.238

S.E.
.041

Wald
33.742

Sex

.027

.373

.005

Maritalstatus

Step 2

df
1

Sig.
.000

Exp(B)
.788

1

.942

1.028

-1.051

.275

14.647

1

.000

.350

Constant

8.567

1.007

72.368

1

.000

5256.184

Age

-.257

.046

30.616

1

.000

.774

Sex

-.033

.424

.006

1

.939

.968

Maritalstatus

-.952

.297

10.265

1

.001

.386

meetorganization

-.765

.271

7.951

1

.005

.465

Familyassociation

2.170

.341

40.393

1

.000

8.758

Constant

9.017

1.215

55.062

1

.000

8245.634

Step1: χ2=178.295 , df=3, Nigelkerke R2=0.463, 0.000<0.1, N=447, Percentage correct=83.7
Step2: χ2=84.330, df=3, Nigelkerke R2=0.560, 0.000<0.1, N=447, Percentage correct=85.9

A final logistic regression model was produced to test whether social learning
indicators discriminate between active and passive participants controlling for age, sex,
and marital status. Similarly to the previous models, this model has a high discriminatory
power with a Nagelkerke R2 value of .56. Participation level was accurately predicted
with a 86% precision rate Both family association and the method how the terrorists are
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first exposed to the organization significantly discriminated between active and passive
participants controlling for age, sex, and marital status.

\
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CHAPTER V: Implications

Introduction
Terrorism studies generally lack the appropriate theoretical applications. Scholars
generally try to adapt psychological, political or crime theories in their studies. This
section tries to bond the findings of this study and theoretical explanations of
involvement in terrorist organizations. The findings support relative deprivation,
frustration-aggression and differential association theory.
Relative Deprivation Theory
The results of Hypothesis 2, 8 were a fit for Gurr’s (1970) aspirational
deprivation. These people compare themselves not only with others but also compare
their present to their own past experience. This approach corroborated Gurr’s (1970)
ideas. This idea was tested with the education and working status variables.
Frustration-Aggression
The results of Hypothesis 3, 4, 5, 9 were fit for Dollard’s et.al.’s frustrationaggression hypothesis. The frustration-aggression hypothesis may explain the chosen
differences being active participants and supporters. Those who have a family, a wellpaid job, have accumulated too many things to take risks, and are politically disconnected
may prefer to be supporters. On the other hand, some of the terrorists are ready to be

98

active participants at the same time that they join the terrorist organization. These people
are generally motivated by negative life experiences. Bivariate analysis of being member
versus drop out, loss and family arrest shows that each of these negative variables is a
potential frustration factor.
Differential Association Theory
The results of Hypothesis 1, 6, 7, 10 were fit for Sutherland’s (1947) differential
association theory. Sutherland asserted that criminal activities can be learned from family
members and friends. Most of the active participants have a family member in terrorist
organizations. The recruitment method variable provides more direct measurement.
According to analysis, the probability of being an active participant increases by 11% in
the case of recruitment by a family member, and conversely, is reduced by 9% in the case
of recruitment by a friend.

Policy Implications

The implications of this study can help policy makers, security forces and
terrorism scholars. This data also shows the demographic characteristic of terrorists such
as age, gender, marital status, working status and education levels.
1.

Policy makers should disclose the importance of socially valued goals and
create opportunities.

Government has to increase hope and outcomes. The most important problem is
lack of job opportunities after school and unemployment in the southeastern part of
Turkey. The government has to encourage the private sector to invest in this region of
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Turkey. A terrorist organization does not want such new investments in that area so they
can continue to use it for their aims. Therefore, they carry out terrorist attacks in schools,
hospitals and construction areas. They do not want the improvement of this territory.
Hence, the most important problem is security. Government has to provide security in
that territory.
Education is another important factor in the context of terrorism involvement but
it helps little in its understanding. A terrorist organization wants their members to be
uneducated, not to question and to just obey the orders. According to the relative
deprivation approach, education with work status can easily help to understand the
problem. Economic problems are important factors for terrorism. Education status and
employment opportunities are important factors for policy makers. If the numbers of
unemployed people with a college degree increases, there would be an economic
deprivation among this group.
2.

School drop out is an important effect in the context of the involvement
level so decisions about the suspension or expulsion of students who
join the illegal activities should be based on court order instead of
administrative decision.

A school’s administration’s main priorities are to keep safe the schools, maintain
the educational discipline and keep students focused on their educational objectives. If
students are expelled or suspended, these people are more likely have better involvement
in terrorist activities. Therefore, decision makers should be very careful with their actions
and instead, an administrative decision via a court order can achieve better results.
Additionally, from the drop out students’ perspective, they can continue their education
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and their future career.
3.

Counter terrorism officers should be trained better in communication skills
in order to stop the shocking effects of arrests.

Another significant result concerns the arreed of family members. An arrested
family member become a hero and role model for other family members. Additionally,
during the operations, communication skills would help police to establish positive
relationships. These skills help police to stop collateral damage by minimizing the violent
reactions and too much use of force.
Furthermore, a lost loved one is another factor that had an effect on one being an
active participant. Most deaths or killings occurred in counter terrorism operations. In
today’s world, the police have great technical capacities. With these communication
skills and technical capacities, the police can capture terrorists before the shootout. The
police can also arrest terrorists outside of their cells or caves in order to stop a shootout
and reduce casualties.

Suggestions for Future Studies

Quantitative findings can be analyzed also with qualitative findings. Further
studies can use qualitative techniques in order to better understand how the relative
deprivation, frustration and differential association process can work in practice.
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Conclusion

This study aims to analyze the socio-demographic and motivational differences of
PKK terrorist organization members who belong in different involvement degrees (active
participant and supporter). 10 different hypotheses were used for this aim. The first 7
hypotheses were tested using a t-test, crosstab analysis with a pearson chi-square test.
According to results, there were statistically significant differences in the probability of
being an active participant in deference to their age, work status, school drop out rates,
loss of a loved one in counter terrorism operations, family arrest records, family
association and recruitment methods. Hypothesis 8, 9, 10 were created to test relative
deprivation, frustration and differential association concepts as statistically significant to
show the probability of being an active participant in the PKK terrorist organization.
These hypotheses were tested by using logistic regression. Results show that relative
deprivation, frustration and differential association models were statistically significant
for the probability of being an active participant in the PKK terrorist organization.
Finally, this research has some implications for theory, policy and future studies.
First; findings of this study supported the relative deprivation, frustration-aggression, and
social learning theories and these theories can be applicable to the behaviors of individual
terrorists. Second, policy makers give importance on polices that would integrate social goals
and means; modify educational policies concerning the throwing out and suspension of
students at schools, train police officers for communication skills. Finally, the findings
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suggested that future research can use qualitative methods with quantitative research methods
in order to better understand terrorists’ motivations.
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Apendix B

Component Matrix

a

Component
1

2

3

Recruitment Method

.346

.792

-.205

Family Association

.373

.678

-.171

Education Status

-.496

.427

.679

School Drop out

.686

-.120

.443

Loss of a friend or family

.745

.067

.256

-.248

.118

-.552

member in a terrorist related
incident
Working Status

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
a. 3 components extracted.
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Apendix C
Table 2. T-Test

Group Statistics
Membership of Terror
Organization
Age

N

Mean

Std. Deviation

Std. Error Mean

supporter

139

29.71

5.676

.481

active partcipant

308

23.55

3.070

.175

Independent Samples Test
Levene's Test
for Equality of
Variances

t-test for Equality of Means
95% Confidence
Interval of the

Sig.
(2F
Age

Equal

87.543

Sig.

t

.000 14.859

df

Mean

Std. Error

tailed) Difference Difference

Difference
Lower

Upper

445

.000

6.167

.415

5.351

6.982

12.038 175.477

.000

6.167

.512

5.156

7.178

variances
assumed
Equal
variances
not
assumed
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Apendix D
Table 3. Working Status * Membership of Terror Organization
Crosstabulation

Working Status

Unemployed

Working Part
Time
Working Full
Time
Total

χ2=223.510

a

Count

Membership of Terror
Organization
active
supporter
partcipant
14
222

236

% within
Working Status
Count

5.90%
19

61

80

% within
Working Status
Count

23.80%

76.30%

100.00%

106

25

131

% within
Working Status
Count

80.90%

19.10%

100.00%

139

308

447

% within
Working Status

31.10%

68.90%

100.00%

df=2

R2=.ooo

94.10%

Total
100.00%
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Apendix E

Table 4- Loss of a friend or family member in a terrorist related incident * Membership of Terror
Organization Crosstabulation

Loss of a friend
or family
member in a
terrorist related
incident

Total

No

Count

53.70%

Yes

% within Loss
of a friend or
family member
in a terrorist
related incident
Count

24

209

233

% within Loss
of a friend or
family member
in a terrorist
related incident
Count

10.30%

89.70%

100.00%

139

308

447

% within Loss
of a friend or
family member
in a terrorist
related incident

31.10%

68.90%

100.00%

Total

Chi-Square Values

Membership of Terror
Organization
active
supporter
partcipant
115
99

χ2=98.231

a

df=1

46.30%

R2=.ooo

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 66.55.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

214
100.00%
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Apendix F

Table 5- School Drop out * Membership of Terror Organization Crosstabulation

School Drop
out

Total

No

Count

45.80%

54.20%

100.00%

Yes

% within School
Drop out
Count

15

161

176

% within School
Drop out
Count

8.50%

91.50%

100.00%

139

308

447

% within School
Drop out

31.10%

68.90%

100.00%

Total

Chi-Square
Values

Membership of Terror
Organization
active
supporter
partcipant
124
147

χ2=69.039

a

df=1

R2=.000

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 54.73.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

271
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Apendix G

Table 6- Family Arrest * Membership of Terror Organization Crosstabulation

Family Arrest

a

Total

No

Count

43.40%

56.60%

100.00%

Yes

% within Family
Arrest
Count

33

170

203

% within Family
Arrest
Count

16.30%

83.70%

100.00%

139

308

447

% within Family
Arrest

31.10%

68.90%

100.00%

Total

χ2=38.224

Membership of Terror
Organization
active
supporter
partcipant
106
138

df=1

R2=.ooo

N=447

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 54.73.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

244
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Apendix H

Table 7- Family Association * Membership of Terror Organization Crosstabulation

Family
Association

a

Total

No

Count

50.80%

49.20%

100.00%

Yes

% within Family
Association
Count

42

214

256

% within Family
Association
Count

16.40%

83.60%

100.00%

139

308

447

% within Family
Association

31.10%

68.90%

100.00%

Total

χ2=60.340

Membership of Terror
Organization
active
supporter
partcipant
97
94

df=1

R2=.ooo

N=447

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 54.73.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

191

121

Apendix I

Table 8- Recruitment Method * Membership of Terror Organization Crosstabulation

Recruitment
Method

friend

Count

Membership of Terror
Organization
active
supporter
partcipant
77
115

% within
Recruitment
Method
familymembers

Count
% within
Recruitment
Method

publication

Count
% within
Recruitment
Method

Total

Count
% within
Recruitment
Method

χ2=112.518

a

df=2

R2=.ooo

Total
192

40.10%

59.90%

100.00%

27

191

218

12.40%

87.60%

100.00%

35

2

37

94.60%

5.40%

100.00%

139

308

447

31.10%

68.90%

100.00%

N=447

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 11.51.
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Apendix J

Table 9- Relative Deprivation Table
Variables in the Equation
Step1

Age
Sex

S.E.
.041

Wald
33.742

df
1

Sig.
.000

Exp(B)
.788

.027

.373

.005

1

.942

1.028

-1.051

.275

14.647

1

.000

.350

Constant

8.567

1.007

72.368

1

.000

5256.184

Age

-.130

.047

7.717

1

.005

.878

Maritalstatus

Step 2

B
-.238

Sex

.512

.440

1.356

1

.244

1.669

-.698

.323

4.659

1

.031

.498

Education

-.524

.154

11.581

1

.001

.592

Workstatus

-1.637

.196

69.562

1

.000

.195

9.677

1.202

64.769

1

.000

15939.630

Maritalstatus

Constant
Step1: χ2=112.518 ,
Step2: χ2=102.448,

df=2, Nigelkerke R2=0.463, 0.000<0.1, N=447, Percentage correct=83.7
df=2, Nigelkerke R2=0.656, 0.000<0.1, N=447, Percentage correct=88.1
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Apendix K

Table 10- Frustration Table
Variables in the Equation
Step 1

Age
Sex

S.E.
.041

Wald
33.742

df
1

Sig.
.000

Exp(B)
.788
1.028

.027

.373

.005

1

.942

-1.051

.275

14.647

1

.000

.350

Constant

8.567

1.007

72.368

1

.000

5256.184

Age

-.195

.048

16.378

1

.000

.823

Sex

.637

.461

1.910

1

.167

1.891

Maritalstatus

Step 2

B
-.238

Maritalstatus

-1.194

.318

14.098

1

.000

.303

Loss

1.624

.351

21.414

1

.000

5.075

Dropout

1.700

.399

18.205

1

.000

5.476

.750

.328

5.224

1

.022

2.118

5.786

1.132

26.137

1

.000

325.621

Familyarrest
Constant

Step1: χ2=178.295 , df=3, Nigelkerke R2=0.463, 0.000<0.1, N=447, Percentage correct=83.7
Step2: χ2=84.330, df=3, Nigelkerke R2=0.625, 0.000<0.1, N=447, Percentage correct=86.8

124

Apendix L

Table 11- Differential Association Table
Variables in the Equation
Step 1

Age
Sex
Maritalstatus
Constant

Step 2

B
-.238

S.E.
.041

Wald
33.742

df
1

Sig.
.000

Exp(B)
.788
1.028

.027

.373

.005

1

.942

-1.051

.275

14.647

1

.000

.350

8.567

1.007

72.368

1

.000

5256.184

Age

-.257

.046

30.616

1

.000

.774

Sex

-.033

.424

.006

1

.939

.968

Maritalstatus

-.952

.297

10.265

1

.001

.386

meetorganization

-.765

.271

7.951

1

.005

.465

Familyassociation

2.170

.341

40.393

1

.000

8.758

Constant

9.017

1.215

55.062

1

.000

8245.634

Step1: χ2=178.295 , df=3, Nigelkerke R2=0.463, 0.000<0.1, N=447, Percentage correct=83.7
Step2: χ2=84.330, df=3, Nigelkerke R2=0.560, 0.000<0.1, N=447, Percentage correct=85.9
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